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CHAPTER I – GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
1.1- Introduction 
Starting from 2000, multilateral trade talks and other international conferences have 
manifested a major shift from a general lobby for globalisation to a development 
oriented global integration that takes into account the development interest of 
developing and least-developed countries.1 The United Nations (UN) took the first 
initiative through the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals that was then 
followed by the Doha Development Agenda. The Doha Declaration stresses the idea 
that developing and least-developed countries need to equally benefit from the 
increased opportunities and welfare gains of trade liberalisation. Accordingly, it 
requires placement of the needs and interests of these countries at the heart of the 
Doha Work Programme.2 
 
Actually, the granting of special and differential treatment to developing and least-
developed countries, on the basis that they are not economically strong enough to 
undertake the adjustments for trade liberalisation and need assistance to that effect, 
dates back to the mid-1950’s.3 However, the Doha Round of trade negotiations 
seems to follow a new approach in highlighting the need for operational, effective 
and enabling special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed 
countries.4 
 
Agriculture is an economic sector that employs a significant part of the population of 
African countries and is an area in which almost all African countries have a 
comparative advantage in global trade. Hence, compared to non-agricultural 
products and the service sector, agricultural commodities are of export interest to 
                                                            
1 World Trade Report (2003) 78  
2 Paragraph 2 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
3 Special and differential treatment is first introduced at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)  review  session  in 1955 where Article XVIII of  the GATT was  revised  to permit  contracting 
parties,  the  economies  of which  can  only  support  low  standards  of  living  and  those  in  the  early 
stages of development, to adopt safeguard measures in case of balance of payments problems or to 
promote  the  establishment  of  particular  industries.    See  Kessie  in  Bermann  and Mavroidis  (eds) 
(2007) 17   
4 See paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration   
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African countries. It is also an established fact that an overall economic growth in 
most developing countries is highly dependent on export performance in agricultural 
products,5 which proves the vital role of increased agricultural trade in the economy 
of these countries. However, agricultural trade is the least liberalised sector in the 
multilateral trade arena, being subject to a higher tariff rate and technically 
institutionalised trade distorting domestic support measures, as well as export 
subsidies. Even if a reduction commitment on tariffs and outlays on trade distorting 
agricultural subsidies was undertaken in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
that resulted in the Agreement on Agriculture, still the tariff rates on agricultural 
products are a lot higher than those of industrial products, proving the modest effect 
of the Agreement.6 It is estimated that the average applied Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariffs of developed countries on agricultural products are more than four 
times those applied on industrial products.7 Also, the issue of farming subsidies by 
governments of developed countries and their unpleasant impact on poor farmers in 
developing countries continues to be a point of contention between the developing 
and developed worlds.8 Taking all these facts into consideration, the Director-
General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) termed agricultural trade as ‘the 
most protected, subsidized, and thus distorted sector of members’ economy’.9  
  
On the other hand, the Agreement on Agriculture contains lots of special and 
differential treatment clauses in favour of developing and least-developed 
countries.10 The Doha Ministerial Declaration also requires special and differential 
treatment to be an integral part of all elements of agricultural negotiations and to be 
embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments. This is to some extent 
reflected in the current negotiating draft text on agricultural trade.11 Unlike the GATT 
provisions, the Agreement on Agriculture contains detailed special and differential 
treatment clauses, most of which are legally enforceable by their nature. However, 
                                                            
5 Diaz, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 27 
6 Anderson in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 31 
7 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 22 
8 Zunckel (2004) 4 
9 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 23 
10 Paragraph 6 of the Preamble and Articles 6(2), (4)(b), 9(4), 15, 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture   
11 Paragraphs 2, 6‐8, 16, 18, 27, 28, 31, 32, 48, 57, 58, 63‐65, 72,78, 103, 105, 120‐149, and 153 of 
the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture 
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the mere fact that they are enforceable in character does not necessarily mean that 
they are important, since their importance greatly depends on their relevance in 
effectively addressing the interests of the beneficiaries. It is the basic aim of this 
research paper to evaluate the importance of the existing special and differential 
treatment clauses for agricultural growth in African countries, taking the above point 
into consideration. 
  
What makes trade in agriculture different and more sensitive than other WTO 
concerns is that it is an area in which most developing and least-developed countries 
have a concrete export interest, thereby looking for freer trade therein, while most 
developed countries are still in a protectionist practice.12 The sensitivity of 
agricultural discussion is witnessed in the pre-Doha multilateral trade negotiations 
where the success or failure of each round was directly tied to the outcome of the 
agricultural negotiations.13 Agricultural trade also acquires a central place in the 
current Doha Round of trade negotiations.    
 
1.2- Objectives of the Research  
The main objectives of this research are:  
• to identify the major interests of African countries in agricultural trade; 
• to examine the existing trade rules on agriculture and current negotiations on 
how far they affect (positively and/or negatively) the interests of African 
countries; and, most importantly, 
• to critically analyse the economic resonance of special and differential 
treatment provisions in respect thereof. 
Moreover, the research paper seeks to investigate the possible ways in which 
African countries can maximise their benefit from the existing special and differential 
treatment clauses for trade in agriculture, and, then, make recommendations as to 
what should be the potential bargaining position of African countries with regard to 
future trade negotiations on agricultural trade. 
                                                            
12 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 8  
13 Desta (2006) 29    
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1.3- Significance of the Research 
Traditionally the economy of most African countries is dependent on agriculture. But, 
in addition, agriculture is a sector in which most African countries have a 
comparative advantage and thus an export interest in the global market. 
Nonetheless, the global trade in agricultural products is less liberalised than trade in 
industrial products in that import tariffs on agricultural commodities are too high, 
coupled with tariff peaks and tariff escalation, while the rate of reduction or 
liberalisation is very low.14 
To make things worse, the global trade in agricultural products is highly distorted 
because of the domestic support and export subsidies rich countries give to their 
farmers and traders to boost production and export capacity.15 This reality is sore to 
most African countries who cannot freely export the one thing in which they have a 
comparative advantage due to the high tariff wall in the developed world.16 It also 
became hard for the unsubsidised, rather taxed, small scale farmers in African 
countries to compete with the large scale farmers in the developed world, who 
provide subsidised cheap agricultural products to the global market. It is common to 
see diversified farm subsidy schemes in most of the developed countries that make it 
impossible for farmers in poor countries to compete on a level playing field with 
those subsidised agricultural producers in developed countries.17  
Even if the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations has brought a separate discipline 
for trade in agriculture, it did not push down agricultural tariff rates and subsidy 
outlays to a meaningful level that can improve the market access for agricultural 
products of developing countries. The subsequent Ministerial meetings could also 
not manage to further liberalise the sector and agriculture continues to be the major 
area of divergence between the developed and the developing worlds. Even the 
Doha Round, which is supposed to be a ‘development round’ for developing and 
least-developed countries, did not bring any progress in this area up to this date. In 
the Mini-Ministerial Conference held in July 2008, too, countries failed to bridge their 
                                                            
14 World Trade Report (2003) Executive Summary, XIX   
15 Desta (2006) 23 
16 Diaz, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 29 
17 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 22‐23 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
differences in agricultural matters, which resulted in the collapse of the whole 
negotiation and left the issue of agriculture without any solution.18  
The special and differential treatment clauses under the Agreement on Agriculture 
tend to adopt a protectionist or defensive approach, in that the Agreement allows, 
among other things, a lesser rate of tariff and subsidy reduction, and longer period of 
implementation, for developing countries while excluding less-developed countries 
from any reduction commitment. The same approach has been adopted in the 
current agricultural negotiating draft that offers preferential treatment in the form of 
lesser rate of tariff and subsidy reduction, longer period of implementation, greater 
percentage of tariff lines for designation of sensitive products, designation of special 
products for more flexibility, and introduction of Special Safeguard Mechanisms, for 
developing countries, while least-developed countries are still excluded from any 
commitment.19 
Here the research question is: whether the existent special and differential treatment 
clauses for trade in agriculture and the approach adopted therein are effective in 
addressing the trade needs of the developing world, particularly African countries? 
What is it that African countries need with regard agricultural trade and to what 
extent do the special and differential treatment clauses address this need?  
1.4- Scope of the Research 
The issue of trade in agriculture is a sensitive one for all developing and least-
developed countries in the entire world. But the scope of this research will be limited 
to the concerns of African countries. Moreover, even if all trade matters under the 
WTO are tied to special and differential treatment clauses, the analytical part of this 
research will concentrate more on the special and differential treatment clauses 
related to trade in agriculture. 
 
 
 
                                                            
18 <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/news08_e.htm> [accessed on 5 January 2009] 
19 Paragraphs 7,8,16,63,72,105,120‐149 and 153 of the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture 
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1.5- Methodology and General Overview of Chapters 
 
The research will essentially be a literature based study. In examining issues of 
interest to the research objective, reference will be made both to primary and 
secondary sources. The various legal texts and official documents of the WTO, 
including members’ notifications to the Committee on Agriculture and African Group 
negotiating proposals will be primary sources of reference. As a secondary source, 
the research will heavily rely on statistical publications of the WTO, Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), World Bank and other relevant 
organisations. Reference will also be made to relevant books, scholarly articles, 
discussion papers, reports and websites, as secondary sources of information. 
 
The research paper is structured into five chapters. The first chapter will elucidate                 
the overall objective of the research and also provide a background discussion on 
agricultural trade matters and special and differential treatment. Under the second 
chapter, the conceptual evolution of the different forms of special and differential 
treatment will be discussed, together with the theoretical justifications for and the 
criticisms against the application of such different forms of special and differential 
treatment. 
 
The third chapter will make an assessment of the status of agricultural trade in the 
multilateral trading system. Based on the premise that agricultural trade has been 
less regulated and more distorted in the past, recent developments in the disciplining 
of the global agricultural trade will be considered under this chapter. Particularly, an 
examination will be made on market access, domestic support and export subsidy 
disciplines of the Agreement on Agriculture and the progress under the Doha Round 
of trade negotiations. 
 
The fourth chapter will examine the role of agriculture and trade in agricultural 
products in the economy of African countries and the various constraints facing 
agricultural export growth in such countries. Then, based on the various interests 
African countries have or should have in agricultural trade, a pragmatic assessment 
will be done as to how far the interests of African countries are addressed in the 
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different special and differential treatment clauses under agricultural trade rules. 
Particularly, an examination will be done of the economic weight the existing special 
and differential treatment provisions carry for the agricultural sector of African 
countries. Finally, the fifth chapter will provide major conclusions of the whole study 
and make relevant recommendations on the matter.  
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CHAPTER II – SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
2.1- Introduction to Special and Differential Treatment 
The notion of special and differential treatment has been employed since the early 
days of the GATT. Yet, none of the Agreements under the GATT and subsequently 
under the WTO regime have stipulated a single legal definition for the term ‘special 
and differential treatment’. Rather, the Agreements set the different forms of special 
and differential treatment and their manner of application in different situations. 
Hence, based on its nature and forms, special and differential treatment can be 
defined as the differential and preferential rights and privileges that are given to 
developing countries, but not extended to developed countries, under the multilateral 
trading system.20  
In regard of their low economic status and developmental needs, developing 
members of the WTO, unlike their developed partners, receive various forms 
differential and preferential treatments. However, akin to its definition, there is no 
objective determination or limitation on the nature and scope of special and 
differential treatment, nor is there an official list of developing countries, as 
beneficiaries of special and differential treatment, under the WTO.21 Hence, in the 
absence of a standard criterion to determine the nature and scope of special and 
differential treatment, any deviation from the general rules of the WTO, permitted 
only in favour of developing members or, any other standard of treatment that is 
more beneficial or preferential for developing members will form part of special and 
differential treatment. In the affirmation of the above point one writer states: 
[Special and differential treatment] is a newer concept, and has 
been less clearly defined, but it appears at a minimum to mean 
assisting developing countries to comply with current rules.22 
The idea of special and differential treatment was not an integral and inherent part of 
multilateral trade liberalisation when the latter conceptually evolved in the 1940’s. At 
that time, when countries realised the economic benefit of opening up one’s market 
                                                            
20 Whalley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 473 
21 Under the WTO, members form part of a category of developing countries through self‐designation. See Carl 
(2001) 31  
22 Page (2004) 4 
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and decided to establish a global framework for trade liberalization, the issue of 
developing countries or differential treatment was not on the agenda.23 It rather got 
its foundation following the movement towards trade liberalisation, when developing 
countries started to feel the economic imbalance between developed and developing 
contracting parties of the GATT and the difficulty they were facing in complying with 
and implementing their obligations due to their low level of economic development.24 
Consequently, the idea of special and differential treatment was introduced to 
accommodate the trade and developmental needs of developing countries under the 
multilateral trading system. The subsequent topics will examine the theoretical 
justifications for the application of special and differential treatment, the conceptual 
evolution and the resulting current forms of special and differential treatment, and 
some of the criticisms against their application.  
2.2- Rationales for the Introduction of Special and Differential 
Treatment under the Multilateral Trading System 
The fundamental reason for the introduction of special and differential treatment 
under the GATT was basically related to the prevailing disparity in economic 
development among contracting parties of the time. With increment in the number of 
developing countries acceding to the GATT, the discontent of these countries for 
being equally treated with the developed countries has also increased. Developing 
countries started opposing the general application of the GATT on the argument that 
‘equal treatment of unequals is unjust’.25 Accordingly, developing countries called for 
the adoption of increased obligations on developed counties regarding the treatment 
of developing countries and reduced duties on their side. In the words of Robert 
Hudec: 
The developing country bloc has sought two kinds of change in 
general. It has urged the developed countries towards a greater 
‘‘legalism’’ - more effective enforcement of developed country 
obligations, and adoption of new developed country obligations for 
the particular benefit of developing countries. On the other hand, 
                                                            
23 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 16 
24 Id, 17 
25 Wolf in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 436 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
the bloc has worked just as hard to remove inconvenient GATT 
obligations controlling its-own conduct.26  
Among the various rationales contemplated, the primary rational for the introduction 
of special and differential treatment under the multilateral trading system is the 
difference in economic and financial policies between developing and developed 
countries, as a consequence of the difference in their level of economic 
development.27  
In fact, one of the major criticisms against the original text of the GATT and the notion 
of trade liberalisation in the 1940’s was the assumption taken under the GATT that 
there is an ‘economic homogeneity’ and common interest among contracting parties 
of the GATT,28 while in reality there was not. According to proponents of special and 
differential treatment, industries of developing countries, being in an early stage of 
development, cannot freely compete with established industries of the developed 
world, and therefore, need a certain level of market protection in their favour.29 
Hence, developing countries were of the opinion that, due to their low level of 
industrial development, they cannot afford to take an equal commitment with those of 
industrialized countries in the multilateral trade Agreements. Particularly, they cannot 
afford to freely open their markets for the outside world to the extent that drives their 
domestic industries out of the market and, discourages the establishment of new 
industries. Accordingly, the idea that developing countries need to be granted 
differential and preferential treatment to protect their industrial establishments, even 
in derogation of their general obligations, was established through time.    
Moreover, the prevalence of balance of payments problems in most developing 
countries, due to less diversification of exports and dependence on exports of low 
price products has also laid the foundation for the introduction of special and 
differential treatment.30 This reality justifies the need for flexibility in favour of 
developing countries in two ways.  
                                                            
26 Robert Hudec (1975) 208 
27 Stevens in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 535‐6  
28 Carl (2001) 36 
29 Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 345  
30 Michalopoulos (2000) 3 
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On the one hand, developing countries have taken a view that tackling balance of 
payments problems necessitates diversification of exports through the establishment 
of new industries for the production and export of diversified products, especially 
products with relatively high price and low volatility.31 To that end, developing 
countries started pushing for the provision of special and differential treatment in the 
form of a permission for the application of some trade restrictive measures with a 
view to promote the domestic establishment of particular industries. On the other 
hand, developing countries have rationalised the need for flexibility in the imposition 
of temporary import restrictions so as to directly deal with the financial aspect of their 
balance of payment problems – preserving the outflow of hard currency.32 
The second fundamental justification for the introduction of special and differential 
treatment is the increased cost of adjustment and implementation of obligations 
under the multilateral trading system.33 Beyond progressive reduction of import 
tariffs, accession to the WTO requires members to make sure that their domestic 
laws and regulations are compatible with the WTO rules.34 Such requirements were 
demanding for most developing countries which had adopted import substitution as 
their economic policy and were enforcing the same through their laws and 
regulations.35 Hence, upon accession to the WTO, most of the developing countries 
were basically obliged to amend their domestic laws and regulations in accordance 
with the WTO rules.  
Also, there was consensus that the obligations under some of the WTO Agreements 
are quite technical, the implementation of which requires establishment of new 
institutional frameworks and progress in technical capacity.36  
All these requirements entail a significant cost of adjustment and implementation that 
is onerous for developing countries to afford, given their fragile economies. 
Consequently, the need for a longer period of implementation and technical 
                                                            
31 Michalopoulos (2000) 3 
32 Whalley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 474 
33 Chadha in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 3 
34 See  for  instance Article 41(1) of  the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) that requires members to bring their domestic  laws on enforcement of  intellectual property rights  in 
conformity with the provisions under the Agreement.   
35 Carl (2001) 34 
36 Michalopoulos (2000) 17 
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assistance in favour of developing members is recognized under the WTO as part of 
special and differential treatment.37  
The other major rationale for the introduction and provision of special and differential 
treatment is the need to facilitate integration of developing countries into the 
multilateral trading system.38 This justification begins with the premise that 
developing countries have been marginalised in the international trading arena; their 
share in the world trade is very minimal and; most of them suffer from balance of 
payments problems. This point is well reflected by one scholar as: 
Developing countries are intrinsically disadvantaged in their 
participation in international trade, and therefore, any multilateral 
agreement involving them and developed countries must take into 
account this intrinsic weakness in specifying their rights and 
responsibilities.39 
Hence, to mainstream developing countries in the trading system, there was a need 
for the introduction of a new scheme that could particularly enhance export 
opportunities for products originating from these countries. Accordingly, a call arises 
for the introduction of a system of preferential market access for products of 
developing countries, without a requirement on such countries to grant a reciprocal 
market access.  
2.3- Conceptual Evolution of Special and Differential Treatment 
The recognition and adoption of special and differential treatment under the 
multilateral trading system was not instant. It is rather a result of the gradual 
conceptual evolution and development dynamics of the past fifty years. Depending 
on the differing developmental, financial and trade needs of developing countries in 
different points in time, the various forms of special and differential treatment came 
into being during different phases. This section will examine the conceptual evolution 
of special and differential treatment in three phases – the pre-Uruguay period, 
Uruguay Round and post-Uruguay period.     
                                                            
37 Chadha in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 3 
38 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 13 
39 Michalopoulos (2000) 15 
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2.3.1- The Pre-Uruguay Period 
Upon adoption of the GATT in 1947, the idea of special and differential treatment got 
no recognition under the newly created multilateral trading arena.40 Contractual 
parties of the time did not make any indication of differential or more favourable 
treatment for the developing parties in the application of the GATT. Rather, it was 
made clear that for the mutual advantage of all, the GATT will equally apply on all 
contractual parties through a reciprocal arrangement.41 Hence, the rights and 
obligations of all parties under the GATT were alike. 
Differentiation between developed and developing contracting parties and flexibility 
in favour of the latter was first introduced upon the revision of Article XVIII of the 
GATT in 1955.42 In recognition of the difference between developed and developing 
parties in their level of financial stability and industrial development, Article XVIII of 
the GATT was revised to permit developing parties to temporarily modify or withdraw 
their tariff concessions and/or impose import restrictions in order to promote the 
establishment of a particular industry or safeguard their financial position against 
balance of payments problems. This revised provision of the GATT made, for the 
first time, a distinction between contracting parties of the GATT, through the 
provision of the above mentioned flexibilities to ‘contracting parties the economies of 
which can only support low standards of living and are in the early stages of 
development’.43  
The issue of developing countries was then brought for discussion in the 12th session 
of the GATT contracting parties in 1957. In the session, the contracting parties 
indentified fluctuating commodity prices and the prevalent insufficiency of export 
earnings to meet import demand in developing countries as the major drawbacks in 
the multilateral trading system.44 Consequently, a panel of experts chaired by 
Professor Gottfried Haberler was established to examine the above mentioned 
drawbacks in the trading system, which panel came up with a finding that the trade 
barriers products of developing countries face in the developed market are too high, 
                                                            
40 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 16  
41 Paragraph 3 under the preamble of the GATT 
42 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 17 
43 See Article XVIII (1) and (2) of the GATT 
44 Keck and Low  (2004) 4 
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thereby rendering the export earnings of developing states insufficient to meet their 
developmental needs.45 
Subsequent to the Haberler Report, a committee established by contracting parties 
of the GATT to further investigate the problems of developing countries, often known 
as Committee III, delivered the following report as to the prevalent imbalance of 
trade between developing and developed parties of the GATT:  
...high tariffs faced exports of less-developed countries in a wide 
range of products... The less-developed countries had experienced 
particular difficulties in negotiating reduction of those duties, 
especially because the principal suppliers of some of these 
products were not less-developed countries and because the less-
developed countries often had little to offer in tariff negotiations...of 
4400 tariff concessions made in the Dillon Round, only 160 were on 
items considered to be of export interest to the less-developed 
countries.46 
Hence, in regard to the trade and development needs of developing countries, the 
idea of reduction of trade barriers in developed states for products of export interest 
to developing countries was suggested by Committee III in 1963. This proposal for an 
improved market access in favour of products of developing countries received a 
legal foundation in 1966 with the incorporation of part IV in the GATT text, as a part 
on trade and development. The incorporation of part IV of the GATT was a vital stride 
in the conceptual evolution of special and differential treatment in that it, for the first 
time, listed the trade and development needs of developing countries and recognized 
the application of special and differential treatment in an explicit manner. 
Part IV of the GATT starts with the reaffirmation of the fact that there is a wide gap in 
the standard of living between developed and developing countries and thus, the 
need to enable developing countries to use special measures for the promotion of 
their trade and development.47 Basically, the incorporation of part IV of the GATT has 
                                                            
45 The report is commonly known as the “Haberler Report”, after the name of the chair person – Professor 
Haberler 
46 Paragraphs 229‐30 of the Committee III Report, See also Hindley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 468  
47 Article XXXVI (1) (c) and (f) of the GATT 
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resulted in the introduction of two crucial notions within the multilateral trading 
system. 
Primarily, part IV of the GATT has introduced the notion of preferential market access 
for products of export interest to developing countries. In this regard, Article XXXVI 
(1) of the GATT provides that developed countries shall ‘to the fullest extent possible’ 
accord high priority and refrain from introducing or increasing tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers on products of export interest to developing countries. Even if the term 
employed under Article XXXVI (1) resulted in the creation of no enforceable legal 
obligation on developed countries,48 it has at least introduced the system of 
preferential trade in favour of products of developing countries that was later 
authorised under the Enabling Clause.  
The other major introduction of part IV of the GATT is the idea of non-reciprocity in 
tariff negotiations. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the GATT was first 
introduced on the foundation principle of reciprocity, in that, a country will open its 
market for products of another country in return for the market access its products 
enjoy in the other country. The GATT further asserts the principle of reciprocity under 
Article XXVIII (1) bis, which provides that negotiations for the reduction of the general 
level of tariffs and other charges will be undertaken on reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous grounds.49 Generally, before the incorporation of part IV, the GATT 
was operating market liberalisation and tariff negotiations on a give and take basis. 
While introducing the notion of non-reciprocity, Article XXXVI (8) of the GATT 
provides that: 
The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or 
remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed 
contracting parties. 
Essentially, the notion of non-reciprocity is that developing countries need not 
reciprocate for tariff concessions made to them by developed countries in trade 
negotiations.50 Hence, it enables developing countries to enjoy MFN market access 
                                                            
48 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 23‐4 
49 See also Paragraph 3 under the preamble of the GATT 
50 Whalley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 475 
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in developed countries without granting a similar market access for products of 
developed countries; even without making any concession for that matter.  
As it will be discussed in-depth in the last section of this chapter, the notion of non-
reciprocity is highly criticised for pushing developing countries away from being active 
participants in tariff negotiations, thereby facilitating their marginalisation in the 
multilateral trading system.51 This is because, the notion of non-reciprocity 
guarantees developing members to benefit from the results of tariff negotiations 
without even making concessions or contributions to such negotiations. This 
discourages developing members from making concessions and having an active 
role in trade negotiations. It seems it is in recognition of such criticisms that a gradual 
shift is made from the notion of non-reciprocity to less-than-full reciprocity in the 
Uruguay and the subsequent Doha Round of trade negotiations.52 
Beside the incorporation of part IV of the GATT, the other important development in 
the pre-Uruguay period was the introduction of the General System of Preferences in 
favour of developing countries. Even if developed countries were ‘encouraged’ to 
provide improved market access for products of export interest to developing 
countries under part IV of the GATT, it did not provide any express waiver from or an 
exception to the MFN obligation of parties. It is later, in 1971 that a ten years waiver 
was granted for members from their MFN obligation for the provision of preferential 
market access to products of developing countries.53 However, due to the temporary 
nature of the waiver,54 there was a need for the establishment of a permanent legal 
ground to the Generalised System of Preference, which gave rise to the adoption of 
the Enabling Clause in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations in 1979.55  
The Enabling Clause has presented the Generalised System of Preference as a 
permanent exception to the MFN obligation, in that, developed countries are allowed 
                                                            
51 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 18 
52 See Paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and also the Agreement on Agriculture under which 
both developed and developing members gave tariff concessions, but at a different rate    
53 See the Decision of 25 June 1971‐Generalised, Non‐reciprocal and Non‐discriminatory Preferences Beneficial 
to Developing Countries   
54 The particular waiver  is granted only  for 10 years. Besides, waivers are normally granted on a conditional 
and temporary basis, being subject to revision. See more on Article IX(3) and (4) of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the WTO   
55 Decision on Differential and more Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries, November 1979  
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to grant preferential market access exclusively to developing countries, without being 
responsible for discriminatory treatment under Article I of the GATT.  
The Enabling Clause has also introduced the idea of graduation for the first time.56 
The notion of graduation came into the picture when some of the developing 
countries started to gain better terms of trade and became competitive in the world 
market, thereby rendering the continued provision of special and differential 
treatment to such countries economically and politically costly on developed 
countries.57  
 In this respect, Paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause provides that developing 
countries are expected to fully participate in the framework of the rights and 
obligations of the GATT, and make concessions on mutually agreed terms with the 
progressive development of their economies and improvement in their trade 
situations. This means, upon attainment of a certain level of economic and industrial 
development, a developing state needs to be graduated or excluded from the 
category of ‘developing states’ and thus, from being a beneficiary of special and 
differential treatment. However, no objective criterion is set under the Enabling 
Clause as to what level of progress will suffice for the graduation of a developing 
member form its category. It rather sets the broad principle of graduation, leaving the 
details of its application for future negotiations.   
Moreover, the Enabling Clause has brought a dynamic transformation in the evolution 
of special and differential treatment through the creation of differentiation among 
developing countries. Under the Enabling Clause, a distinction is made between 
developing and least-developed countries on the application of the Generalised 
System of Preference. Accordingly, Paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause permits 
developed countries to grant deeper preferences to least-developed countries, 
without providing the same to developing countries. This has generally opened the 
door for a separate consideration of the financial, developmental and trade needs of 
least-developed countries from the needs of developing countries.58                 
 
                                                            
56 Keck and Low (2004) 5 
57 Hindley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 468‐9 
58 See Paragraph 8 of the Enabling Clause 
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2.3.2- The Uruguay Round 
In addition to establishment of the WTO, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
gave birth to various new Agreements including: the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA), the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) and many others. All the Agreements resulting from the Uruguay 
Round form part of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, most of them 
being multilateral trade Agreements.59 Unlike the original text of the GATT, the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, under its preamble, recognises the 
trade and developmental needs of developing countries as one of its core 
concerns.60 
The primary development in the Uruguay Round is that the different Agreements 
resulting from the Round have incorporated diversified and new forms of special and 
differential treatment in their text. This is mainly because the implementation of 
obligations in most of these new Agreements requires members to have a better 
technical and institutional capacity.61 Hence, taking into consideration the general 
lack of technical and institutional capacity in most developing countries, the 
Agreements came up with new special and differential treatment clauses in the form 
of longer transitional periods and technical assistance for developing members. 
Accordingly, almost all of the Agreements in the Uruguay Round call developed 
members and international institutions to support the better integration of developing 
countries into the global trading system through the provision of technical 
assistance.62 
The other remarkable development in the Uruguay Round is the dramatic shift in 
negotiating approach from non-reciprocity back to reciprocal trading arrangements 
that take into account the needs of developing members - what is later termed as 
                                                            
59 Multilateral Agreements, unlike Plurilateral Agreements, are automatically binding on all members  in  the 
Uruguay Round and, are binding on new members upon accession with a single undertaking.  See Article II and 
XII of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO  
60 See paragraph 2 under the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO 
61 Keck and Low (2004) 6 
62 See Articles 9, 11, 67, 27(2), and 20(3) of SPS, TBT, TRIPS, DSU and  the Agreement on  Implementation of 
Article VII of the GATT 1994, respectively.   
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less-than-full reciprocity.63 There are, in fact, different suggestions as to the reasons 
for the change in negotiating approach, among which, the change in domestic 
economic policy in most of the developing countries from import substitution to 
increased export performance through active involvement in market access 
negotiations is the major one.64 
In the pre-Uruguay period, tariffs and non-tariff barriers on products of competitive 
interest for developing countries were too high, while the participation or the role of 
developing countries in shaping and influencing multilateral trade negotiations was 
insignificant.65 Hence with time, developing countries have started to realise that they 
did not gain much from the protectionist or defensive approach that they were 
exercising under the guard of the principle of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations. 
Accordingly, in the Uruguay Round, developing countries have developed an interest 
to participate in negotiations and take negotiated commitments so as to gain an 
improved market access for products of export interest to them, particularly, 
agricultural and textile products.66 In this respect, developing countries were 
successful in bringing their interests to the negotiating table with the subsequent 
introduction of new disciplines on both agricultural and textile trade at the end of the 
Uruguay Round. Consequently, under the Agreement on Agriculture, developing 
countries, just like their developed partners, have assumed obligations in the 
reduction and elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, though the level of 
concession they made is relatively lower than the concessions made by developed 
states.67 
Nonetheless, least-developed members have been exempted from making reciprocal 
concessions in the Uruguay Round. In this regard, the Decision on Measures in 
Favour of Least-Developed Countries, which is among the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, provides that: 
                                                            
63 Whalley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 477‐8  
64 Ibid 
65 Hindley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 468 
66 Hoekman in Guha‐Khasnobis (ed) (2004) 11 
67 Developing countries have agreed to reduce their average tariff rate on agricultural products by 24%, while 
the developed countries have to reduce by 36% 
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...the least-developed countries, for so long as they remain in that 
category, while complying with the general rules...will only be 
required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent 
consistent with their industrial development, financial and trade 
needs, or their administrative and institutional capabilities.68  
Lastly, on the issue of differentiation of least-developed members from their 
developing partners, the Uruguay Round, in continuation of the approach adopted in 
the Enabling Clause, called for greater preferential treatment in favour of least-
developed countries in the form of deeper preferential market access, more flexible 
transitional periods and increased technical assistance.69    
2.3.3- The Post-Uruguay Period 
As discussed earlier, the concept of special and differential treatment had expanded 
in scope and form in the pre-Uruguay period and the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations. At the end of the Uruguay Round, special and differential treatment got 
various forms including: the permission to deviate from tariff commitments, impose 
quantitative restrictions or apply greater subsidies under certain circumstances; 
preferential market access under the Generalised System of Preference; longer 
periods of implementation and, technical assistance in favour of developing 
countries. 
However, with the expansion of the concept, the doubt as to the effectiveness of the 
various forms of special and differential treatment in properly addressing the trade 
and development needs of the beneficiaries has also increased.70 Many have been of 
the opinion that the operating special and differential treatments did not bring much 
benefit to developing countries, most of which are not yet economically better-off.71 
Hence, in the post-Uruguay period, much emphasis has been placed on improving 
the enforceability and effectiveness of the existing special and differential treatment, 
rather than further expanding its scope and form. Members’ great concern over the 
                                                            
68 Paragraph 1 of the Decision on Measures in Favour of Least‐Developed Countries 
69 Ibid, Paragraphs 1 and 2 
70 Whalley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 487 
71 Ibid 
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effectiveness of special and differential treatment is clearly manifested in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, which provides that: 
...all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed 
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, 
effective and operational.72 
It seems that the Doha Ministerial Declaration gives more weight, among all forms of 
special and differential treatment, to preferential market access for products of export 
interest to developing countries. It is because, the provisions of the Declaration highly 
emphasise on the idea that developing countries need to secure a fair share in the 
global trade,73 which essentially requires the provision of an increased and 
preferential market access benefits for products of developing countries. Accordingly, 
the Declaration sets out a general objective for the establishment of a duty-free 
quota-free market access regime for products originating from least-developed 
countries,74 which objective got a concrete legal basis later in the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference, 2005. 
Under the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, developed members of the WTO made 
a commitment to provide duty-free quota-free market access for all or at least 97% of 
the products originating from least-developed countries.75 Unlike part IV of the GATT 
and the Enabling Clause, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration has introduced a 
zero tariff market access for products of least-developed countries and also, 
employed terminology that imposes an obligation on developed countries, rendering 
the scheme with an enforceable character. This commitment can in fact be 
considered as a culmination in the conceptual development of preferential market 
access, as far as least-developed countries are concerned. It also indicates the high 
level of acceptance that the idea of improved market access gets in the multilateral 
trading system.  
However, the practical application of duty-free quota-free market access is not as 
ideal as it seems in that, there are some doubts as to the effectiveness of the scheme 
                                                            
72 Paragraph 44 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration   
73 See Paragraph 2 under the preamble of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
74 See Paragraph 42 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration  
75 Paragraph 36 under Annex F of the Ministerial Declaration in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, 22 
December 2005  
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in properly addressing the export interests of least-developed countries.76 
Particularly, the permission for exclusion of 3% of countries’ tariff lines from the duty-
free quota-free market access can significantly impair the benefits that are normally 
expected to arise from the scheme. This is because; export shares of most least-
developed countries in the markets of developed states is very small and can easily 
fall under the 3% flexibility. As identified in one study, 3% of the tariff lines of most 
developed states easily account for 90%-98% of the total exports from least-
developed countries.77 This in effect means developed countries can practically 
exclude almost all products of export interest to least-developed countries from the 
duty-free scheme by the simple exclusion of only 3% of their tariff lines, which will 
defeat the purpose of entire scheme. 
2.4- Basic Categories of Special and Differential Treatment 
As it was discussed in the previous section, it took about half a century for special 
and differential treatment to gain the present form. Currently, there are different forms 
of special and differential treatment. In this section, all special and differential 
treatment provisions under the multilateral trading system are grouped into two 
general categories, based on the nature of differentiation and preference they 
provide. Accordingly, they are categorised as; special and differential treatments 
which involve the positive action of developed members and, special and differential 
treatments in the form of lesser and flexible obligations on developing members. The 
subsequent section will deal with the various forms of special and differential 
treatment under each category and issues involved therein. 
2.4.1- Special and Differential Treatments which Involve the Positive 
Action of Developed Members 
This category of special and differential treatment incorporates all those provisions 
which oblige or encourage, as the case may be, developed members of the WTO to 
provide differential and preferential treatment to developing members or their 
products. Taking the diverse needs of developing countries into account, the different 
Agreements under the WTO call developed members to grant preferential market 
                                                            
76 Laborde (2008) 8  
77 Id, 5 
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access to products of developing members; pay due consideration to the 
developmental needs of developing members and, extend technical assistance to the 
same.78 These three forms of special and differential treatment have a commonality 
to the extent that the benefit developing countries can potentially get from any of 
them is dependent upon the positive action that developed countries will be willing to 
take. 
The first form of special and differential treatment under this category is the provision 
of preferential market access for products of developing countries. This particular 
form of special and preferential treatment is conceptually the most important one 
since increased trade opportunities for products of export interest is the vital and 
continuing quest of developing countries.79 In the affirmation of this fact, part IV of the 
GATT asserts that there is a strong direct correlation between export earnings and 
economic development in developing countries and thus, there is the need for rapid 
and sustained expansion of export earnings in developing countries.80 In this regard, 
the Enabling Clause, which introduces the Generalised System of Preference on a 
permanent basis, provides that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General 
Agreement, contracting parties ‘may’ accord differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries without according 
such treatment to other contracting parties...81               
The Enabling Clause permits developed members to derogate from their MFN 
obligation under Article I of the GATT to make preferences exclusively to developing 
members or their products. However, it imposes no obligation on developed 
members to grant such preferences. It rather legalises the provision of preferential 
market access by relieving developed members from their MFN obligation in 
circumstances where they are willing to grant a preference. But, once a developed 
                                                            
78 See for instance, Articles XXX:2 of the GATS, 9.1 of SPS Agreement, 67 of TRIPS and 11 of the TBT Agreement    
79 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 21 
80 Article XXXVI (1) (b) and (2) of the GATT 
81 Paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause 
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member chooses to give preferential market access, it has an obligation to apply the 
preference on a non-discriminatory basis among the developing members.82 
Even though the Generalised System of Preference is recognised as a vital form of 
special and differential treatment,83 it does not escape from critics as to its 
practicability; it is even the most vastly criticised form of special and differential 
treatment. 
Criticisms against the Generalised System of Preference start with the voluntary 
nature of the system.84 As mentioned earlier, the Enabling Clause introduces the 
preferential system in ‘may’ clause that gives full discretion for developed members 
to grant, not to grant or to withdraw an ongoing preference on their choice. This 
makes the entire system unsecured for developing countries,85 since the preferential 
market access they are currently enjoying can be terminated at any point in time, 
even without any reason. 
Moreover, the economic benefit developing countries can potentially derive from the 
Generalised System of Preference is mitigated due to the prevalent exclusion of 
products which are of vital export interest to developing countries, especially 
agricultural and textile products, from the preferential arrangement.86 According to a 
report by the Director-General of the WTO in 2005, the average preferential tariff rate 
applied by the EC, US and Japan on agricultural products of developing countries is 
approximately 69%, 56% and 69%, respectively, greater than the average 
preferential tariff on industrial products.87 This clearly shows that even if agricultural 
products are covered under the preferential trading system, the degree of tariff 
preference these products are enjoying is very minimal, as compared to industrial 
products. 
                                                            
82 However, the obligation of a preference granting state not to discriminate among developing members  is 
narrowly  interpreted  by  the WTO Appellate  Body  in  the  EC‐Tariff  preferences  that  limits  the  scope  of  the 
obligation  only  to  non‐discrimination  among  similarly  situated  developing  members,  thereby  authorising 
discrimination  among  developing  countries  based  on  an  objective  criteria.  See  the Appellate  Body  Report, 
European  Communities  –  Conditions  for  the  Granting  of  Tariff  Preferences  to  Developing  Countries, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004,  DSR 2004:III, 925     
83 Michalopoulos (2000) 7 
84 Gallagher (2000) 15  
85 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 2 
86 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 19‐20 
87 Id, 19 
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Logically, considering the fact that the Generalised System of Preference is 
introduced to promote the export opportunities of developing countries, the 
effectiveness of the system as a special and differential treatment is highly 
dependent upon the prioritised inclusion of products of vital export interest to 
developing states into the system. This is because; it is naturally on areas of 
comparative advantage and export interest, particularly in agriculture, mining and 
textile and clothing, that developing countries greatly need market access. Hence, 
restricting the application of the preferential system only to products which are not of 
major export interest to the beneficiaries or, a bias towards the same will apparently 
defeat the very purpose of the preferential system. 
The issue of preference erosion is also another point of discontent commonly raised 
by developing countries.88 The fact that there is reduction of MFN tariff rates across 
the board under a series of multilateral trade negotiations and, even elimination of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers through regional trade Agreements among developed 
countries has resulted in diminution of the benefits developing countries used to get 
from the preferential market access scheme.89 Consequently, with a view to preserve 
their margin of preference, beneficiaries of preferential arrangements tend to become 
opponents of a broad based trade liberalisation under the multilateral trading 
system.90       
In general, these and other related pitfalls of the Generalised System of Preference 
lead some to the conclusion that the preferential system is used by developed 
countries as ‘an easy substitute for the action [they took] in more essential areas’.91 
In addition to the Generalised System of Preference, the other important form of 
special and differential treatment under this category is the provision of technical 
assistance for developing countries. Some of the Agreements under the WTO require 
members to have a considerable level of technical, institutional and legal capacity for 
compliance with the obligations therein. For instance, under the SPS Agreement, 
members are required to undertake a scientific risk assessment or apply international 
                                                            
88 Gallagher (2000) 15 
89 Alexandraki and Lankes in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 399 
90 Id, 397 
91 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 21   For further discussion on the pitfalls of the Generalised 
System of Preference, see Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 343 
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technical standards before taking SPS measures on imports.92 Hence, if an import 
involves a scientific risk or does not meet the international technical standards of 
safety, an SPS measure can be legitimately imposed on it. Developing countries 
might face two different difficulties from this particular provision. 
Firstly, members are prohibited from applying SPS measures on imports unless they 
took a scientific risk assessment test that requires the acquisition of technical 
facilities and expertise, which are scarce in most developing countries.93 Secondly, 
exports of developing countries can be easily subjected to SPS measures by 
importing members for not meeting scientific or international technical standards of 
safety, which are onerous to meet for most developing countries given their less-
sophisticated and stagnant production technology.94  
The same is true with the TBT Agreement and TRIPS, both of which require 
members to have an established technical, institutional as well as legal capacity to 
comply with and/or implement their commitments under each Agreement.95 Here, 
most developing countries will inevitably face difficulties to comply with and 
implement their obligations due to technical and institutional incapacity, which 
essentially is intrinsic to their low level of economic development.  
It is based on the above premise that the provision of technical assistance is 
recognised as a vital form of special and differential treatment under most of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.96 Under such Agreements, developing countries are 
promised technical assistance in the form of training, advice, grant or credits on 
production technology, technical standards, promotion of infrastructure, research and 
on other related areas.97 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the provision of technical assistance, 
as a form of special and differential treatment, has a commonality with the 
preferential market access scheme in that the execution of both requires the 
affirmative action of developed members. Furthermore, like the Generalised System 
                                                            
92 Article 3 of the SPS Agreement 
93 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 18  
94 Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1998) 242, See also Ghatak and Ingersent (1984) 10    
95 See Articles 10 and 41 of the TBT  and TRIPS Agreements, respectively  
96 See Articles XXX:2 of GATS, 67 of TRIPS, 3.3 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, 9.1 of SPS 
Agreement and 11 together with 12.7 of the TBT Agreement    
97 Ibid  
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of Preference, developed members are not under any obligation to provide technical 
assistance for developing members. Rather, developed members are called to grant 
technical assistances on ‘mutually agreed terms’,98 which makes the provision of 
such assistance permissive and not obligatory.  
However, unlike the Generalised System of Preference, the provision of technical 
assistance is not entirely dependent upon the positive will of developed members, 
since part of such assistance will also be granted by the WTO Secretariat and other 
international organisations.99 
2.4.2- Special and Differential Treatments in the Form of Lesser and 
Flexible Obligations on Developing Members  
The second category of special and differential treatment covers those provisions 
under the GATT or the WTO Agreements which impose lesser or flexible obligations 
on developing members than the ordinary obligations applicable on developed 
members. In most of the multilateral trade Agreements, the level of commitment 
developing countries are required to undertake is relatively lesser than the 
commitment of developed countries and, the former are also given a longer period to 
implement their commitments. Besides, under some of the multilateral disciplines, 
developing members are totally excluded from taking commitments or, are allowed to 
provisionally set-aside the commitments they undertook.100 
The major rationale for the provision of those special and differential treatments 
under this category is to give a certain level of flexibility or breathing space for 
developing countries to implement their individual development policies and 
programmes, even in derogation of some of the WTO rules.101 Sometimes, the 
implementation of domestic financial or developmental programmes might 
necessitate members to adopt a certain level of trade protectionism, which is 
restrictively disciplined under the WTO rules. Hence, the basic concern is to make 
sure that the commitments and concessions under the multilateral trading system will 
                                                            
98 See Articles 3.3 of  the Agreement on Preshipment  Inspection, 67 of TRIPS and 20.3 of  the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of GATT   
99 See Article XXV:2 of the GATT, Paragraph 12 of the Understanding on Balance of Payments Provisions of the 
GATT and Section D of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism  
100 See Article XVIII of the GATT 
101 See Article XVIII  (2) of  the GATT and Paragraph 1 of  the Decision on Safeguard Action  for Development 
Purposes  
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not hamper the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.102 
Further, the recognition that developing members do not have the economic, 
institutional and technical sufficiency to implement their obligations on the same pace 
with developed members has laid the foundation for the introduction of some of the 
special and differential treatment clauses under discussion. 
The undertaking of lesser commitments by developing members in trade negotiations 
is among the typical forms of special and differential treatment under this category. 
Lately, with the transformation of the notion of non-reciprocity into less-than-full 
reciprocity, developing members have started taking negotiated commitments and 
concessions with a certain degree of flexibility as policy space. In this regard, 
Paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration provides that: 
...negotiations shall take fully into account the special needs and 
interests of developing and least-developed country participants, 
including through less-than-full reciprocity in reduction 
commitments...103 
The Agreement on Agriculture is one example in which, developing members hold 
lesser obligations in terms of tariff and subsidy reduction commitments; while least-
developed members are entirely exempted from taking any reduction commitment.104 
Also, under the draft negotiating texts of the current Doha Round, both for agricultural 
and non-agricultural products, it is proposed that developing countries hold lesser 
rates of tariff reduction commitment, through a greater coefficient under non-
agricultural market access.105                   
The other form of special and differential treatment under this category is the 
flexibility given to developing countries to implement their financial and development 
policies by setting aside the application of some of the general rules of the WTO. 
Safeguard measures in Article XVIII of the GATT, under which developing countries 
are authorised to impose market access restrictions on imports for the establishment 
                                                            
102 Paragraph 5 of the Enabling Clause  
103 See also Paragraph 2 under Annex B of the Doha Work Program, Decision Adopted by the General Council 
on 1 August  2004, WT/L/579  
104 See Articles 6(2), 9(2) (b) (iv) and 15 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
105 See Paragraphs 5 and the following of the Revised Draft Modalities for Non‐Agricultural Market Access  and,  
Paragraphs 63 and the following of the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture 
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of a particular industry and in cases of balance of payments problems, is a classic 
form of special and differential treatment under this category. Accordingly, in the 
circumstances mentioned above, developing members are permitted to modify or 
withdraw their concessions or, impose quantitative restrictions setting aside the 
application of Articles II and XI of the GATT, respectively.         
Besides, the exclusion of agricultural investment and input subsidies of developing 
members from the domestic support reduction commitment under Article 6 (2) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture is a clear instance of special and differential treatment in 
the category of ‘flexibility and lesser obligations’. In the case of least-developed 
members, the flexibility is even broader, which in some instances goes to the extent 
of exemption of these set of countries from any commitment.106 
Another important flexibility in favour of developing members is the authorisation 
under the Enabling Clause for the formation of preferential trading regimes among 
developing members, without extension of such trade preferences to developed 
members. Under the Enabling Clause, developing members are given the liberty to 
form regional or global arrangements for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs 
among themselves.107 This provision is an exception from the MFN principle under 
Article I of the GATT because had it not been for the authorisation in this provision, 
any favourable arrangement among developing states can be legitimately claimed by 
any developed member on the base of non-discrimination or the MFN principle. It is 
also considerably beneficial for developing members because it permits them to form 
preferential market arrangements exclusively among themselves without the 
conclusion of regional trade Agreements, which are tied to strict requirements under 
Article XXIV of the GATT. Hence, the arrangement under the Enabling Clause makes 
the formation of preferential trading blocs among developing countries easier and 
more flexible, without any formality requirement to fulfil. 
Here, it is worth noting that, unlike the first category, all forms of special and 
differential treatment under the second category are legally enforceable in character 
in that, developing countries can legitimately set aside the application of some of the 
multilateral rules, without being responsible for violation, or, they will not be obliged to 
                                                            
106 See Article 15 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
107 Paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause 
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undertake commitments beyond the reduced rate they are provided with through 
special and differential treatment. 
2.5- Major Criticisms against Special and Differential Treatment 
Even if the idea of special and differential treatment gets full recognition and, is 
incorporated under almost all of the WTO Agreements, it does not mean that it is 
absolutely defect free. With time, the relevance of the different forms of special and 
differential treatment and their impact on the multilateral trading system have faced 
various criticisms from different angles. 
Primarily, flexibilities and exemptions from the ordinary rules are criticised for they 
discourage developing countries from making internal policy and institutional 
adjustments necessary for their effective integration into the multilateral trading 
system.108 This is mainly because, when developing members are permitted to slow 
their pace of trade liberalisation and easily set-aside the application of the basic 
trading rules, they will tend to reduce their effort towards liberalisation since there is 
no urge to do so.  
Especially, the notion of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations has been strongly 
criticised for promoting a sense of ‘free riding’ among developing countries.109 It is 
argued that due to the notion of non-reciprocity in trade negotiations, developing 
countries have became disinterested to engage in exchange of concessions that in 
turn resulted in the prevalence of high tariffs on products of export interest to them.110 
In addition, the provision of broader flexibilities for developing members is criticised 
because it largely motivates developing countries to adopt a protectionist or 
defensive orientation that is in opposition to their development needs and the 
aspirations of the multilateral trading system.111 One writer, in his argument against 
special and differential treatment, states the conceptual contradiction between the 
multilateral trade liberalisation and special and differential treatment as: 
                                                            
108 Sharer (2000) 1 
109 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 18 
110 Hindley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 468 
111 Michalopoulos (2000) 12 and 28 
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The demands of developing countries, however understandable in 
origin, were mistaken and were indeed demanding to the 
sustainability of the liberal trading system.112  
Many opponents of special and differential treatment argue that the creation of 
diverse loopholes in the GATT and, the subsequent erosion of the basic principles of 
the GATT are inherently incompatible with the maintenance of stable, transparent 
and liberal trade policies.113 This even backfires against developing countries, which 
were supposed to be beneficiaries of the flexibilities. For instance, foreign investors 
always need stability, transparency and security in the policy framework of host 
states which can be gained from the adoption of the WTO rules as they are. Hence, 
when there is a wide range of flexibility in the hands of host states, there is lesser 
policy security and thus, foreign investment incentive.114 
Some also challenge the general application of most special and differential 
treatment provisions in favour of all developing members.115 With demonstration of 
progress in the economy of some developing countries, the idea of making a 
distinction among developing members based on their level of development and, the 
graduation of some from the benefit of special and differential treatment became a 
prevalent thought, especially among developed countries.116 In support of a dissimilar 
treatment among developing members, one writer argues: 
There is very little economic reason to suggest that some of the 
more developed of the developing countries cannot compete in the 
products in which they have comparative advantage with developed 
countries...117 
Even if a distinction is already made between least-developed and developing 
countries under most of the special and differential treatment provisions, one cannot 
find the same distinction in the treatment of developing countries. This makes it 
                                                            
112 Wolf in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 437 
113 Id, 443 
114 Diaz, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 25 
115 Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (2007) 334  
116 Ibid 
117 Michalopoulos (2000) 25 
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hardly possible for the system to separately and effectively address the problems of 
those developing countries which are in a serious need of help. 
Hence, the analogous treatment of those developing members which demonstrate a 
better integration and a competitive share in the world market with those developing 
members which are still marginalised in the trading system hampers the 
effectiveness of special and differential treatment provisions.118 
Lastly, it is worth noting the argument of some that the multilateral trading system, 
particularly the WTO, is not the proper forum to deal with the issue of economic 
development or the specific problems of developing countries.119 According to 
proponents of this argument, there are proper forums established to exclusively deal 
with issues of development and concerns of developing countries, hence, bringing 
the same matter under the international trading arrangement distorts the rule based 
multilateral trading system and, is not well founded on an ‘ethical premise’.120       
2.6- Conclusion 
Neither the notion of special and differential treatment nor the term developing 
countries are given an official definition under the GATT and the WTO. But based on 
its application and different forms, special and differential treatment can be defined 
as the differential and preferential rights and privileges that are given to developing 
countries, but not extended to developed countries, under the multilateral trading 
system.  
Currently, after the conceptual evolution of special and differential treatment for half a 
century, developing countries are granted various forms of special and differential 
treatment that includes: flexibilities to deviate from tariff commitments, impose 
quantitative restrictions or provide subsides under certain circumstances, preferential 
market access under the Generalised System of Preference, longer period of 
implementation and technical assistance in favour of developing countries. 
However, through time, the major emphasis of special and differential provisions has 
moved from the imposition of lesser and flexible obligations on developing members 
                                                            
118 Michalopoulos (2000) 25 
119 Hindley in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 467 
120 Ibid 
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to the provision of improved preferential market access for products of export interest 
to developing members. Due to the continued pursuit of improved market access 
opportunities and better terms of trade by developing countries, the Generalised 
System of Preference has got a central place in the concern of special and 
differential treatment.     
Lastly, even if the introduction of special and differential provisions is backed by 
sound economic and political justifications, the administration, relevance and 
effectiveness of some forms of special and differential treatment are subjects of 
diverse economic criticisms.            
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CHAPTER III – TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS UNDER 
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
3.1- Major Peculiarities of Trade in Agricultural Products 
As it will be seen in more detail under the subsequent sections, there is a substantial 
difference in the disciplines which regulate trade in agricultural products from that of 
industrial products. Also, agricultural commodities are mostly subjected to high tariffs 
in the world trade, compared to the tariffs applied on industrial products.121 As 
identified in one study, while the world average bound tariff rate for agricultural 
products is 62%, industrial products are subjected to an average bound tariff of 
29%.122 Particularly in the Quad,123 the average MFN applied tariff rate on 
agricultural commodities is four times greater than the average tariff applied on 
industrial products.124 Such high tariff walls erected at borders naturally create 
hardship on agricultural exporters to penetrate into the domestic markets of 
importing countries. 
Besides, the prevalent increment of agricultural tariff rates with an increase in the 
level of processing - commonly referred to as tariff escalation – and its adverse 
impact on the establishment and growth of value-added agricultural activities is 
another peculiar feature of agricultural trade.125       
Though the share of trade in agricultural commodities in the total world trade is 
relatively smaller,126 agricultural trade matters are too sensitive, thereby serving as 
deal-makers and breakers in multilateral trade negotiations.127 Agricultural matters 
became this sensitive largely due to the fact that the generous agricultural support 
programmes of developed countries have a damaging impact on the trade interests 
of most developing counties, which have a comparative advantage and an export 
interest in agricultural commodities.128 The trade distorting effects of such support 
                                                            
121 Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 342 
122 World Trade Report (2003) 127 
123 Under the WTO, the term ‘Quad’ refers to the four big trading members – the EC, US, Canada and Japan   
124 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 22 
125 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 8 
126 In the 1990’s, trade in agricultural products cover only 10.3% of the world total trade and, this figure went 
down to 7.9% in 2000‐2002.  See Paiva (2005) 4 
127 Desta (2002) 9 
128 Diaz, Robinson, Thomas and Yukitsugo (2003) 23 
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programmes make it really difficult for poor agricultural producers to effectively 
compete against the ‘deep pockets of the rich and powerful countries of the world’.129 
This, in fact, is reflected in the declining trend in the export of agricultural products 
from developing to developed countries, unlike developing countries’ growing share 
in the export of industrial products.130  
In brief, trade in agricultural products is subjected to a higher level of restrictions and 
distortions as well as, a lower rate of liberalisation in the world market.131 This 
tendency of high protectionism in agricultural trade is not a simple market 
coincidence; rather, it results from the different values that countries attach to 
agriculture. 
Ordinarily, agriculture has a vital role to play on matters of food safety and security, 
environmental protection and bio-diversity, rural development, alleviation of poverty, 
animal welfare, cultural heritages and some other issues, which are commonly 
referred to as the ‘multi-functionality effects of agriculture’ or ‘non-trade concerns’.132 
This multi-functional role of agriculture goes to the extent of safeguarding national 
autonomy in the sense that the political independence of a country is highly reliant 
on agricultural self-sufficiency, particularly food security.133 Consequently, such 
interconnectivity with all the above issues gives agriculture an important place in the 
economic, social, political, cultural and environmental aspects of human life.  
Accordingly, most countries provide subsidies for their agricultural producers on the 
ground that they need to support one or more of the multi-functionality effects of 
agriculture.134 Here, the problem is: the support and protection extended to 
agricultural producers under the guise of multi-functionality concurrently stimulate 
agricultural production and, distort the world market to the detriment of agricultural 
producers in poor countries.135 Hence, it became a legitimate concern to look for a 
means, if any, to separate the production effect of agriculture from its accessory 
                                                            
129 Josling in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 60 
130 Between the years 1980‐81 and 2000‐01, while the agricultural export share of developing countries to the 
developed market decreases from 25.8% to 22.9%, their share in the export of industrial products raises from 
12.7% to 21.1%. See Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 16 
131 Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1998) 55  
132 Paarlberg, Berdahl and Lee in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 205   
133 Desta (2002) 308 
134 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 25  
135 Diaz‐Bonilla, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 22  
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multi-functionality effects and, support the latter in exclusion of the former. It is with 
this idea in mind that members are required to decouple income support payments 
from production type or volume and also, exclude productivity from being a 
prerequisite in the provision of Blue Box and Green Box domestic support 
measures.136 But, as it will be examined in the coming section, there are some 
doubts as to the effectiveness of these requirements in practically delinking or 
avoiding the production stimulant effects of such support measures.   
The following sections will examine in detail the differing characteristics of 
agricultural disciplines under the multilateral trading system and, the efforts made to 
bring agricultural trade in compliance with the general principles of the WTO.        
3.2- Trade in Agriculture under the GATT 
Some writers identify trade in agriculture as a segment that did not fall within the 
scope of regulation of the GATT and thus, did not form part of the multilateral trade 
disciplines in the pre-Uruguay period.137 This assertion is hardly acceptable given the 
comprehensive scope of the original provisions of the GATT and the subsequent 
evolution thereof. 
When the GATT was adopted in 1947, it was meant to govern the multilateral trading 
system on all products that fall under the definition of ‘goods’.138 In the GATT 
provisions that set the founding principles, including the MFN, National Treatment, 
tariff concessions and reciprocity, reference is generally made to import and export 
products, with no distinction among the different types of products.139 Hence, 
Agricultural products, being in the general category of goods or products, were under 
the full regulation of the GATT.  
However, as it will be seen in detail below, agricultural products had been subjected 
to prominent exceptions under the GATT. Yet, even these exceptions did not 
exclude agricultural products from the GATT regulation; they rather exclude 
                                                            
136 See paragraph 6 under Annex 2 and, Article 6 (5) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
137 Hertel and Martin in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 1 and 61  
138 In paragraph 2 under the preamble of the GATT, one of the founding objectives of the GATT  is to expand 
the production and exchange of ‘goods’ 
139 See Articles I,II, III and XI of the GATT under which a reference is made to ‘products’ in general   
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agricultural products from some of the general principles and regulate them 
separately as GATT exceptions. 
Under the original GATT text,140 agricultural products were subjected to an 
exceptional treatment in the application of one of the fundamental principles of the 
GATT – the prohibition of quantitative restrictions. Taking the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers and progressive liberalisation of tariffs as its central objectives,141 the GATT 
under Article XI (1) forbids the application of import or export prohibitions and 
restrictions in the form of non-tariff barriers. However, this prominent provision of the 
GATT suffers from an exception when it comes to the importation and exportation of 
agricultural products. 
Under Article XI (2) (a) of the GATT, members are allowed to temporarily apply 
export prohibitions or restrictions for the prevention or relieve of critical food 
shortage. This is a clear case of exception from paragraph 1 of the same Article 
because, in the instances of critical shortage of foodstuffs, which are agricultural 
products, members are relieved from their obligation not to apply export restrictions 
and prohibitions. Besides, under Article XI (2) (c) of the GATT, members are 
authorised to impose restrictions on the importation of agricultural and fishery 
products for the removal of a temporary surplus or to restrict the domestic production 
and marketing of like or substitutive products. These two sets of exceptions from the 
general prohibition of quantitative restrictions form the initial deviations of the GATT 
in the market access regulation of agricultural products. Accordingly, unlike in the 
case of industrial products, the application of non-tariff barriers on agricultural 
commodities got a continued existence under the GATT regime.  
The second set of exception in the treatment of agricultural products came with the 
adoption of Article XVI (3) and (4) in the GATT revision session of 1955. Under 
section B in Article XVI of the GATT, while the application of export subsidies is 
generally prohibited, an exceptional permission is made in relation to primary 
products which essentially include agricultural products in their natural form or with a 
                                                            
140 The text adopted in 1947, before being revised in 1955 
141 Rao and Guru (2003) 35 
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slight degree of processing.142 As it will be seen in detail under section 3.3.3, export 
subsidies are among the most obvious trade distorting forms of agricultural 
subsidies.143 It is in recognition of this trade distorting effect that Article XVI (4) of the 
GATT prohibits the application of export subsidies regarding industrial products, 
which by definition are non-primary products. However, in relation to primary 
products, Article XVI (3) of the GATT provides an exceptional discipline as: 
...contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on 
the export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party 
grants directly or indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to 
increase the export of any primary product from its territory, such 
subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that 
contracting party having more than an equitable share of world 
export trade in that product... 
Hence, as long as a member can prove that its export of a primary product does not 
go beyond its equitable share of the world export trade, it can freely apply export 
subsidies on primary products. In fact, various cases were brought before the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO in relation to Article XVI (3) of the GATT, 
especially over the interpretation of the phrase ‘more than an equitable share of 
world export trade’, which is the only restriction in the application of export subsidies 
on primary products.  
Accordingly, a member is said to acquire ‘more than an equitable share of world 
export trade’ when there is a growth in the export share of such member through 
displacement of the share of others.144 Hence, to challenge the export subsidy 
regime of another member on primary products, a member has to prove the 
existence of a positive correlation between the export subsidy applied and the 
growth in the export share of the applying member and, most importantly, the 
existence of a market share that it has lost due to the growth in the export volume of 
the applying member. This line of interpretation was concurred by the Panel in EC - 
                                                            
142 As per the  Interpretative Note to Article XVI, section B of the GATT, a primary product  is defined as  ‘any 
products of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing 
as its customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade’.  
143 Desta (2002) 100 
144  See  Article  10  (2)  (a)  of  the  Tokyo  Round  Subsidies  Code  or  The  Agreement  on  Interpretation  and 
Application of Articles VI, XVI, XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade    
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Wheat Flour,145 in which, the Panel authorized the export subsidy regime of the EC, 
despite the fact that there was a significant rise in the world export share of the EC, 
for there was no proof that the reduction in the export share of the USA was due to 
the expanding share of the EC in the world market.146 
Also in French - Wheat,147 the Panel reasoned out its finding that the French export 
subsidy on wheat and wheat flour resulted in the country acquiring more than an 
equitable share in world export trade as follows: 
In the three Southeast Asian markets combined, French supplies 
represented a greatly increased proportion of total imports of wheat 
flour, accounting for 0.7 percent in 1954 and 46 percent in the first 
half of 1958. The share of Australian supplies, on the other hand, fell 
from 83 percent in 1954 to 37 percent in the first half of 1958. While 
other suppliers of wheat flour have recently begun to play a larger 
part in the Southeast Asian markets, and although it is difficult to 
estimate to what extent such incursions as these are displacing 
traditional exporters, it is nevertheless clear that French supplies 
have in fact to a large extent displaced Australian supplies in the 
three markets.148 
In general, this line of interpretation is the latest one in terms of the case 
jurisprudence of the WTO and, is supported by Article 10 (2) (a) of the Tokyo Round 
Subsidies Code, which furnishes it with a certain degree of force. 
Following the market access and export subsidy exceptions of the GATT, the 
deviation of agricultural disciplines from the general GATT principles has further 
broadened upon the provision of a waiver to the USA from Article XI of the GATT in 
its importation of diverse agricultural products,149 and, a generous permission to the 
EC for the application of variable import levies and export subsidies.150 In the 
presence of general exceptions under Article XI (2) of the GATT for the application of 
                                                            
145 European Economic Community – subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour (SCM/42) 21 March 1983  
146 Paragraphs 4.8, 5.3 and 5.4 of the Panel Report on EC – Wheat Flour case 
147 French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour (L/924 BISD 7S/46) 21 November 1958 
148 Paragraph 23(b) and (c) of the Panel Report on French – Wheat case   
149 Waiver Granted to the United States  in Connection with  Import Restrictions  Imposed under Section 22 of 
the United States Agricultural adjustment Act of 1933, Decision of 5 March 1955 BISD 03S/32‐41 June 1955      
150 See Delcros (2002) 222‐3 
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quantitative restrictions on agricultural products, the relevance of the USA-waiver is 
to authorise the USA to apply quantitative restrictions without even meeting the 
requirements set under Article XI (2) of the GATT for the application of the 
exceptions. Accordingly, the waiver gave permission to the USA for an unconditional 
application of non-tariff barriers on the importation of certain agricultural products 
which further weakens the market access discipline of the GATT as far as agricultural 
products are concerned.  
Generally, even though trade in agricultural products was not entirely excluded from 
the GATT regulation, it has been subjected to a series of exceptions and deviations, 
which authorised the application of the most trade distorting practices in relation to 
agricultural products, despite the prohibition on the application of the same on 
industrial products. This, in fact, was a source of discontent for most developing 
members as they have a comparative advantage and an export interest in agricultural 
commodities and, thus, were looking for freer trade and more strict disciplines in the 
area.151  
It is these loopholes in the principal GATT provisions and, the resulting distortion of 
agricultural trade that necessitated the introduction of separate disciplines for trade 
in agricultural products under the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.   
3.3- The Agreement on Agriculture and Its Major Disciplines 
As considered earlier, the various exceptions under the GATT provisions, 
subsequent waivers and lax authorisations have greatly barred the ordinary market 
access and export subsidy disciplines of the GATT from being applicable on 
agricultural products, thereby broadening the difference between the treatment of 
agricultural and industrial products under the multilateral trading system. After 
suffering from distortions for about half a century, the multilateral trade in agricultural 
products has got its own separate discipline upon the adoption of the Agreement on 
Agriculture as one of the results of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and, part 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.152 
                                                            
151 Desta (2002) 107 
152 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Marrakesh 1994)  
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The Agreement on Agriculture did not bring the disciplines for agricultural trade into 
an immediate equivalence with the long established disciplines for trade in industrial 
products; it rather, as stated in its preamble, establishes the basis for the initiation of 
an ongoing reform process.153 
Accordingly, with the view to establish a ‘fair and market oriented agricultural trading 
system’,154 the Agreement on Agriculture has brought explicit disciplines on 
agricultural market access, domestic support and export subsidies, which are 
commonly referred as the ‘three pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture’.155 The 
following section holds a brief discussion of these three pillars of the Agreement on 
Agriculture and the disciplines therein.   
3.3.1- Market Access  
The notion of market access refers to the opening up of one’s domestic market for 
foreign products through a reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on 
imports. Ordinarily, countries have the sovereign power to decide on what to import 
into and export from their territory and so, have the power to control the type and 
volume of imports through tariffs and non-tariff barriers. In the exercise of their 
sovereign power, countries impose tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports for 
diverse reasons including: the protection of domestic producers from foreign 
competition, raising state revenue and, for the implementation of domestic policies 
and programmes like, financial or environmental policies.156  
However, the sovereignty of states and thus, their power to freely impose import 
restrictions is usually limited through the conclusion of international Agreements. 
Accordingly, under the GATT 1947, contracting parties have committed themselves 
to give a secured and predictable market access for products originating from any 
contracting party through binding their tariff reduction commitments and with the 
abolition of quantitative restrictions.157   
                                                            
153 See paragraph 1 under the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture. Moreover, Article 20 of the same 
Agreement sets the foundation for the continuation of the reform process through continuing negotiations 
154 See paragraph 2 under the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture  
155 Goode (2003) 353 
156 Desta (2002) 15 
157 See Articles II and XI of the GATT 1947 
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Given the fact that the global market access is far less liberalised for agricultural 
products than for industrialised products,158 it is not surprising to see market access 
being one of the most important pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture. In this 
respect, one of the major triumphs of the Agreement on Agriculture and, the 
distinguishing feature of agricultural trade from trade in non-agricultural products, is 
the replacement of non-tariff barriers into their tariff ‘equivalent’ through the process 
commonly known as ‘tariffication’.159 Under footnote 1 for Article 4 (2) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, a list of non-tariff barriers is provided that need to be 
converted into ordinary custom duties, which list include: quantitative import 
restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import 
licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, voluntary 
export restraints and similar border measures other than ordinary custom duties. As 
it can be seen from the list, especially from the last phrase, all trade barriers other 
than tariffs or, in simple terms, non-tariff barriers fall under the scope of Article 4 as 
subjects of tariffication.  
Accordingly, Article 4 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits WTO members 
from applying non-tariff measures all of which are already subjected to tariffication. 
However, this prohibition is not absolute in that members can still exceptionally apply 
non-tariff barriers on agricultural imports through Special Agricultural Safeguards 
under the Agreement on Agriculture; in line with balance of payments or other 
general provisions of the GATT and, as per the exception under Annex 5 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.160  
It is in fact worth noting that by permitting the conversion of non-tariff barriers into 
their tariff ‘equivalent’, the Agreement on Agriculture gives a certain degree of 
legitimate recognition to non-tariff barriers, which are generally prohibited under 
Article XI of the GATT. However, given the fact that the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions under the GATT is subjected to various exceptions in its application to 
agricultural products, the process of tariffication does not give recognition to new 
forms of non-tariff barriers; it rather converts those non-tariff barriers that were 
already in effect through the GATT exceptions into their tariff ‘equivalent’.      
                                                            
158 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 22 
159 Desta (2002) 62 and 67 
160 See Article 4 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture and foot note 1 under the same Article 
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The general obligation of members not to apply non-tariff barriers that are subjected 
to tariffication is dealt in India - Quantitative Restrictions,161 in which the Panel found 
India’s measure of quantitative restrictions on agricultural products being in   
violation of India’s obligation not to maintain measures which are required to be 
converted into ordinary custom duties.162 Though, India justified its measures using 
the balance of payments exception under footnote 1 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the Panel, as upheld by the Appellate Body, found that India’s 
quantitative restriction measures did not meet the requirements of Article XVIII of the 
GATT for balance of payments exception and thus, could not be justified by the 
exceptions in footnote 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.163     
Theoretically, tariffication plays an imperative role in the process of trade 
liberalisation because, it is easier to quantify, bound and control tariff rates rather 
than non-tariff barriers.164 Even if a tariff by itself is a trade barrier and, the tariffs 
resulting from the process of tariffication are in effect ‘equivalent’ with their 
counterpart non-tariff barriers, tariffication is useful in simplifying the different forms 
of trade barriers into one form, thereby creating a transparent global trading 
system.165 In fact, the tariffication process under the Uruguay Round makes 
negotiations in the subsequent Doha Round relatively easier because the issue of 
market access has boiled down only to reduction of tariff rates.166 
However, the practical application of tariffication is highly criticized for resulting in 
high tariffs and trade restrictions, even beyond the equivalent of all tariff and non-
tariff restrictions that were applicable before tariffication took place.167 This was 
essentially because, in the instance of converting non-tariff barriers into their tariff 
‘equivalent’, most countries have adopted tariff rates that are in excess of the actual 
equivalent of the non-tariff barriers, which instance is referred as ‘dirty tariffication’.168  
                                                            
161  India  ‐ Quantitative Restrictions on  Imports of Agricultural, Textile and  Industrial Products  (WT/DS90/R) / 
DSR 1999:V, 1799 
162 Paragraphs 5.240‐242 of the Panel Report on India ‐ Quantitative Restrictions case 
163 Ibid, See also Paragraphs 112‐120 of the Appellate Body Report on India – Quantitative Restrictions case  
164 Desta (2002) 67 
165 Delcros (2002) 233 
166 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 22 
167 Finger and Schuknecht in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 278 
168 Goode (2003) 399 
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Beside dirty tariffication, the selection of 1986-88 as the base period for tariff 
reduction commitment in which period tariff rates were particularly too high and, the 
adoption of high ceiling bindings by developing members in return for their unbound 
tariff lines were also among the significant factors for the prevalence of high tariff 
regime after tariffication took place.169 Consequently, even if the tariff rates resulting 
from tariffication were bound and reduced under members’ Schedules of 
concessions, the reduction commitment was not able to bring the desired market 
access reform since reduction was made from bound tariffs which were well beyond 
the applied tariff rates.170 
In spite of its modest effect in the reform process, the market access discipline of the 
Agreement on Agriculture is at least relevant for its control on members not to 
increase their level of tariff protection in the future, furnishing a certain level of 
market security.171 Elaborating on this merit of the Agreement on Agriculture, one 
writer states: 
...in light of the long history of agricultural protection growth in 
industrial countries, even achieving a standstill in agricultural 
protection via the Uruguay Round could be described as progress. 
It would be an advance over what otherwise might have been the 
case in part because it would reduce the risk of newly industrialising 
countries following the more advanced one’s down the agricultural 
protection growth path...172      
Once non-tariff barriers were changed into their tariff ‘equivalent’, tariff reduction 
commitment is given under the Agreement on Agriculture. Accordingly, developed 
and developing members have committed themselves to reduce their overall 
average bound tariff rates on agricultural products by 36% and 24%, minimal 
reduction on each tariff line being 15% and 10%, with an implementation period of 6 
and 10 years, respectively.173 Though the introduction of a separate new discipline 
                                                            
169 Gallagher (2000) 42 
170 Hertel and Martin in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 62 
171 Members  have  given  tariff bindings  in  their  Schedule  of  commitment  from which bindings  they  cannot 
increase their applied tariffs. See Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture   
172 Anderson in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 28 
173 See paragraph 5 of the Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitment under the Reform 
Programme (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) 20 Dec. 1993 and, Article 15 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
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for reduction of agricultural tariffs is a major development by itself, the tariff reduction 
commitment under the Agreement on Agriculture has got certain downsides that are 
worth considering.  
Primarily, the percentage reduction is agreed to be made from bound tariff rates, 
which, due to the dirty tariffication and other reasons mentioned earlier, were far 
beyond the applied tariff rates.174 Hence, what the reduction process did, if at all, is 
reduce the water or the overhang between the bound and applied agricultural tariff 
rates that existed in the pre-Uruguay period. This renders the tariff reduction under 
the Agreement on Agriculture merely numerical but not economical from the 
perspective of agricultural exporters who still have to face similar applied tariff rates. 
Moreover, the fact that a linear reduction is agreed from the overall average 
agricultural bound tariff rate, rather than from each tariff line, has its own adverse 
effect on the reform process. For instance, when developed members commit 
themselves for a 36% reduction, it does not mean that they have to reduce their tariff 
rate on each and every agricultural product by 36%; their commitment only concerns 
the reduction of their overall average agricultural tariff rate. Hence, whatever the 
reduction rate on each tariff line might be, as long as it meets the minimum reduction 
of 15%, a member is only required to bring its overall average agricultural tariff rate 
to a level of 36% reduction from the level on the base period. This undeniably gives 
members the discretion to decide on the rate of reduction on individual tariff lines 
and thus, the leverage to extend protection to their sensitive products through lesser 
tariff cuts.175 
It is the mitigated effect of the general tariff reduction process and the resulting high 
tariff regime that necessitated the introduction of Tariff Rate Quotas for the 
preservation of the pre-Uruguay trend of market access or for the creation of new 
minimum market access opportunities.176 In this regard, members are required to 
maintain the pre-existing volume of agricultural imports or, if such import volume is 
lesser than 5% of the domestic consumption on the base period of 1986-88, provide 
a new minimum market access opportunity that amounts 3% of the domestic 
production, which then will progressively expand to 5% at the end of the 
                                                            
174 Finger and Schuknecht in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 278 
175 Hoda and Ashok (2003) 19 
176 Gallagher (2000) 43 
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implementation period, 2001.177 Accordingly, member’s obligation to grant a 
minimum market access opportunity will get discharged through the imposition of 
lesser tariff rates on a certain minimum volume of import, which is often known as an 
‘in-quota volume’.178 This results in a new agricultural market access arrangement in 
which members have dual tariff bindings - in-quota and out-of-quota tariff bindings.  
Ideally, a system of Tariff Rate Quota is beneficial in rectifying the problems of high 
tariffs for the in-quota volume, which will be subjected to a lesser in-quota tariff rate. 
However, the administration of Tariff Rate Quotas is highly criticised because 
members are given a wider range of discretion and control in the allocation of in-
quota volumes.179 For instance, the minimum market access commitment of 
members is stipulated on an overall average agricultural import basis, which enables 
members to grant distinct tariff quotas for exports from different countries or allocate 
the quota for some specified exports only and, manoeuvre the system in favour of 
their sensitive agricultural products.180 But, given the fact that the system of Tariff 
Rate Quota is introduced to enable exporting members to get at least some 
minimum level of export opportunity, any leverage in the hands of importing 
members to effectively shield their sensitive areas even from the minimum market 
access requirement will clearly defeat the very purpose of Tariff Rate Quotas. 
Besides, there is a legitimate concern that the existence of lesser in-quota tariff rate 
might be used by some members as a cover to avoid a deeper cut in the out-quota 
tariff rates, which cover the majority of agricultural imports.181 
As far as market access is concerned, the last and very crucial introduction of the 
Agreement on Agriculture is the notion of Special Agricultural Safeguard. As per 
Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, members are given the flexibility to 
temporarily deviate from their tariff concessions and, apply a tariff on a particular 
agricultural product in excess of the bound tariff rate when there is a surge on an 
import volume or a fall in the price of that particular agricultural product. The 
                                                            
177  Paragraphs  5  and  6 of  the Modalities  for  the  Establishment of  Specific Binding Commitment under  the 
Reform Programme (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) 20 Dec. 1993 
178 Desta (2002) 78  
179 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 16 
180 Delcros (2002) 234 
181 As reported by the WTO Director‐General in 2005, tariff rate quota covers only 3.3% and 1.6% of the total 
tariff  lines  in  the EC and  Japan,  respectively, which are  the  two members with  the  largest  tariff  rate quota 
coverage  as  compared  to  the  coverage  in  other members.    See  the WTO Director‐General  Annual  Report 
(2005) 16. See also Anderson in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 47  
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Agreement on Agriculture has created a discipline for the application of Special 
Agricultural Safeguard by regulating the level of import volume or price at which the 
measure can be triggered and, the permissible level of tariff rise as a remedy 
available upon trigger. 
Accordingly, members are allowed to deviate from their tariff concessions when the 
current import volume of a certain agricultural product exceeds by 5%-25% the 
import volume of such a product during the base period,182 or when there is at least a 
10% fall in the import price of an agricultural product from the price during the base 
period - 1986-88. As to the tariff deviations or remedies available, while members 
are generally required not to exceed one third of the ordinary custom duty for a 
volume trigger, the permitted level of tariff deviation for price falls increases with an 
increment in the difference between the current import price and the average price 
during the base period.183 
Nonetheless, it is important to notice that the application of Special Agricultural 
Safeguard is not open in relation to all agricultural products. Under Article 5 (1) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, it is clearly provided that a member can make use of 
Special Agricultural Safeguards only for those agricultural products in relation to 
which it has undertaken a tariffication process and, has designated the symbol 
“SSG” under its Schedule of concession. Hence, if an import surge or a price fall 
occurs in relation to a tariff line which is not tariffied or in relation to which a right for 
the application of Special Agricultural Safeguard is not reserved, an importing 
member cannot apply Special Agricultural Safeguard even if the volume or price 
trigger is well beyond the limit. In such cases, what a member can do is to resort to 
the general safeguard provisions under the GATT and the Agreement on 
Safeguards,184 which, however, permit the application of safeguard measures 
subject to the rigorous requirements of serious injury or a threat thereof.185 
                                                            
182 The level of trigger in the case of an import surge differs depending on the percentage share of an imported 
agricultural  product  in  the  domestic  consumption  of  the  same  product  during  the  base  period  ‐  three 
preceding years for which data are available. Accordingly, the greater the share of an import in the domestic 
consumption, the lower the trigger level will be. For details, see Article 5(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture.      
183 See Article 5(4) and (5) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
184 Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture confirms the continued application of the GATT provisions and 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements under Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, on agricultural matters that are 
not covered under the Agreement on Agriculture   
185 See Article XIX (1) of the GATT and Article 2 of the Agreement on Safeguards  
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Of all members to the WTO, only 39 members, with a majority of developing 
members, have made a reservation for the application of Special Agricultural 
Safeguard under their Schedule of commitment.186 Hence, these 39 members are 
the only WTO members that can legitimately make use of the Special Agricultural 
Safeguard mechanism under the Agreement on Agriculture.       
3.3.2- Domestic Support 
The term domestic support indicates any form of support provided by a government 
in favour of its agricultural producers or farmers.187 As it was considered in detail in 
the first section of this chapter, the multifunctional effects of agriculture motivate 
countries to have a broader ground for the extension of diverse protection 
mechanisms in favour of their agricultural sector. In their effort to protect their 
agricultural products, countries usually restrict the importation of foreign agricultural 
products through tariffs and non-tariff barriers and/or promote the production and 
exportation of domestic agricultural products through the provision of various forms 
of support for agricultural producers. Hence, besides the imposition of high tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers on agricultural imports, the other trade protectionist 
mechanism is the provision of domestic support in favour of agricultural producers. 
However, it is not true that the provision of domestic support only targets the 
protection of domestic producers from international market competition. Sometimes, 
countries grant diverse forms of support for their agricultural producers for reasons 
like: production limitation, for rural development, for environmental protection 
programmes or, to improve the living standard of producers.188 
Here, it is worth noting that the trade distorting effect of a domestic support measure 
is highly related to the reason for which it is provided and, particularly, with the actual 
impact of the support measure on production.189 If a certain sort of domestic support 
is provided so as to stimulate production volume or, if provision of the support is 
dependent upon production performance, it will be a trade distorting domestic 
support since, the over-production effect of such a support will benefit the 
                                                            
186 For the list of members, see <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_ssg_e.htm> 
[accessed on 18 January 2009] 
187 See Article 6 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
188 See Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
189 Desta (2002) 306  
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uncompetitive domestic producers at the expense of efficient foreign producers in 
the world market.190 Accordingly, based on the level of trade distortion they can 
potentially produce, the Agreement on Agriculture groups the different forms of 
domestic support measures into three categories, conventionally labelled under the 
WTO as Amber Box, Blue Box and Green Box domestic support measures.191     
The Amber Box domestic support incorporates those domestic support measures 
that are trade distorting by their nature and, thus, are subjects of reduction 
commitment by members.192 Under Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
Amber Box is designated as ‘all domestic support measures in favour of agricultural 
producers with the exception of domestic measures which are not subject to 
reduction’, under the Blue or Green Box. This means, any kind of domestic support 
measure which does not form part of the exclusion under the Green Box or Blue Box 
is by definition an Amber Box domestic support measure, which is a catch all basket 
definition. 
Ordinarily, all the trade distorting domestic support measures, which are related to 
production performance and have a direct impact in boosting productivity, form part 
of the Amber Box domestic support measures.193 Classic examples of Amber box 
domestic support measures are market price support and direct payment to 
agricultural producers contingent upon production performance.194 
Market price support is a prominent form in the application of domestic support 
measures. It is basically a governmental act of artificially fixing the domestic price of 
agricultural products beyond the world price.195 It is called an artificial price fixing 
because, the domestic price will not be determined by the free interaction of demand 
and supply in the domestic market; it is rather fixed by a governmental regulation.196  
Being part of the Amber Box domestic support, market price support targets at 
                                                            
190 Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements (1998) 56 
191 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm> [accessed on 16 December 2008]  
192 <www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm/agreement> [accessed on 5 November 2008]   
193 Since the definition of Blue and Green Box domestic support measures expressly exclude production tied 
support measures, which are of high trade‐distorting effect, such support measures fall under the definition of 
Amber Box domestic support. See Articles 6(1) , (5) and Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture     
194 Desta (2002) 310 
195 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 23 
196 For instance, it is estimated that the price of agricultural products in the Organisation for Economic Co‐
operation and Development (OECD) countries is fixed to be around 30% greater than the world price. See 
Paiva (2005) 6  
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increasing the profit of agricultural producers, thereby stimulating productivity. In 
normal economic circumstances, if production return increases beyond the ordinary 
level due to a high fixed price, rationally, producers will positively respond to the 
stimulant and increase productivity. This means, market price support has a direct 
relationship with productivity and, mostly results in production surplus.197 
Fixing higher domestic price is a positive stimulant not only to domestic producers 
but also to foreign exporters, who will be motivated to export more to that particular 
country to take advantage of the higher price in the domestic market.198 
Consequently, market price support mostly calls for the imposition of import 
restrictions and the provision of export subsidies so as to discourage over flooding of 
imports and, get rid of the domestic production surplus, respectively.199  
The other downside of market price support is that instead of improving the livelihood 
standard of small producers, it greatly benefits large scale agricultural producers, 
who take greater proportion of the price support due to their higher production 
volume.200 Hence, rather than redistribution of income in favour of poor farmers, 
market price support mostly results in accumulation of profit and over production by 
the beneficiary large scale agricultural producers. Generally, due to such multiple 
economic impairments it causes, market price support can be designated as one of 
the most trade distorting forms of Amber Box domestic support measures. 
However, despite its high trade distorting nature, market price support is the most 
widely used form of domestic support in many developed countries.201 This can be 
easily inferred from the high share of market price support in the general provision of 
domestic support measures, which share accounts around 57%, 38% and 90% of 
the total domestic support provision in the EC, USA and Japan, respectively.202                
The generous provision of Amber Box domestic support measures and the resulting 
trade distortion became the major concerns of most developing countries as well as 
the Agreement on Agriculture due to the competitive interest most developing 
                                                            
197 Desta (2002) 311 
198 Ibid 
199 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 23 
200 Id, 25‐6 
201 Desta (2002) 310 
202 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 24 
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countries have on agricultural production and, the adverse effect of Amber Box 
support programmes on the trade interests of developing countries.203 Though it is 
true that the application of Amber Box domestic support measures has a detrimental 
effect on the trade interests of all agricultural exporters, such a detriment is more 
severe on developing countries which provide no or very insignificant amount of 
production subsidies for their agricultural producers.204 All the negative 
consequences of developed countries’ Amber Box domestic support measures, 
including distortion of natural market competition, price volatility and import surges, 
operate directly against agricultural producers in developing countries who have a 
natural comparative advantage in the area but got diminutive trade shares in world 
trade.205 Proving the adverse effects of Amber Box domestic support measures on 
developing countries, all simulations for the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
have demonstrated a finding that agricultural production of developing countries will 
significantly increase if there is a reduction in the application of trade distorting 
subsidies in the developed world.206         
It is in recognition of the adverse effects of Amber Box domestic support measures 
that the Agreement on Agriculture for the first time requires members to bind and 
reduce their annual budgetary outlays on Amber Box domestic support measures, 
which outlay is referred under the Agreement as Total Aggregate Measure of 
Support (Total AMS).207 As noted under Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
the technical calculation of Total AMS in monetary terms involves the summation of 
budgetary outlays for non-exempt direct payments, market price support as derived 
from the price difference in the domestic and external market and, an outlay for any 
other subsidy not exempted from reduction commitment.      
 
In the entire history of subsidy disciplines under the GATT and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), members have never been required 
to quantify, schedule and reduce their subsidy outlays; rather, depending on the 
                                                            
203 Zunckel (2004) 1 
204 Hoekman, Francis and Olarreaga in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 103 
205 Hoekman, Michalopoulos and Winters in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 540  
206 Diaz, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 23 
207 Under Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) is defined as the 
annual level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided in favour of agricultural producers as  product‐
specific or non‐product‐specific support, other than those supports excluded from reduction under the same 
Agreement.    
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nature of different subsidies, members were either totally prohibited from applying 
some subsidies or were allowed to apply some others in a manner that does not 
affect the interests of other members.208 Hence, the approach adopted under the 
Agreement on Agriculture to quantify, bind and progressively reduce Amber Box 
domestic support outlays can be considered as one of the diverse ‘innovations’ of 
the Agreement on Agriculture.209  
 
Accordingly, under the Agreement on Agriculture, developed members are bound to 
reduce their Total AMS outlay by 20% in six years implementation period starting 
from 1995, while developing members will reduce their outlay by 13.3% within ten 
years implementation period as of 1995.210 Thus, as per Articles 3 (2) and 6 (3) of 
the Agreement on Agriculture, members are prohibited from providing Amber Box 
domestic support measures in excess of the commitment levels under their 
Schedules of concession. Here, it is worth noting that the domestic support reduction 
commitment Schedule of each member forms an integral part of the GATT 1994.211 
Hence, provision of Amber Box domestic support measures by any member beyond 
its bound commitment level amounts to a violation of its own domestic support 
reduction Schedule and also a violation of the GATT 1994. 
 
However, a reduced application of Amber Box domestic support measures is allowed 
only for those members which specify their Total AMS commitment level under part 
IV of their Schedule.212 Hence, if a member makes no specification of its Total AMS 
outlays in its Schedule of commitment, it cannot benefit from the AMS reduction 
discipline of the Agreement on Agriculture and, is restricted to the de minimis amount 
in its application of Amber Box domestic support measures.213 Yet, of all members of 
the WTO, only 34 members have scheduled their AMS outlays,214 which 34 
members are therefore the only members which can provide Amber Box domestic 
support measures in excess of the de minimis amount. In fact, major providers of 
                                                            
208 See Article XVI of the GATT and Articles 3 and 5 of the SCM Agreement  
209 Desta (2002) 393 
210 The percentage reduction is agreed to be made from the Total AMS on the base period 1986‐1988  
211 Article 3(1) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
212 Article 7(2)(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture   
213 Ibid 
214 The  list of 34 members which have a scheduled commitment over their Total AMS outlays  is available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm> [accessed on 20 January 2009] 
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Amber Box domestic support measures, including the EC, USA and Japan, have 
scheduled their AMS outlays and thus, are authorised to keep on the provision of 
such measures with a reduced amount. This reasonably shades a certain level of 
doubt as to the effectiveness of the requirement of scheduling in trimming down the 
widespread application of Amber Box domestic support measures, given the fact that 
the requirement has no control over major suppliers of trade distorting domestic 
support measures. 
                    
The general reduction discipline of the Agreement on Agriculture over Amber Box 
domestic support outlays is not absolute in that members are given the flexibility to 
exclude some ‘minimal’ amount of trade distorting support –de minimis- from the 
calculation of Total AMS and thus, from a reduction commitment.215 As a de minimis 
amount, developed and developing members are permitted to provide trade 
distorting domestic support of up to 5% and 10%, respectively, of their total value of 
agricultural production being out of the reach of reduction commitment. This 
practically means the Amber Box reduction discipline is effective only on those 
members whose outlay on such domestic support measures is more than the de 
minimis amount.216 
 
Besides, under Article 6 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture, developing countries 
are given further flexibility to exclude some particular forms of Amber Box domestic 
support measures - agricultural investment and input subsidies as well as subsidies 
for diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops - from the calculation of Total 
AMS outlays or from reduction commitment. This flexibility forms part of special and 
differential treatment provided in recognition of the developmental and trade needs 
of developing countries. 
The second category of domestic support measures under the Agreement on 
Agriculture is the Blue Box domestic support, which refers to direct payments made 
by governments in favour of their agricultural producers under production-limiting 
                                                            
215 Article 6(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture   
216 Only 30 members provide Amber Box domestic  support measures beyond  their de minimis  level.  Thus, 
these  30  members  are  the  only  WTO  members  that  are  subjected  to  the  reduction  commitment.  See 
<www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm/agreement > [accessed on 16 January 2006] 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
programmes.217 This category of domestic support has a commonality with the 
Amber Box domestic support measures to the extent that the application of both is 
tied to production volume. This can be seen from Article 6 (5) (a) of the Agreement 
on Agriculture under which, the basis for the provision of Blue Box domestic support 
measures is either production yields per fixed area or a livestock payment per fixed 
number of heads. The primary difference between the Blue Box and Amber Box 
domestic support measures is that the former is not provided as a production 
incentive; rather, it is a production-limiting support. But still, the Blue Box domestic 
support is not totally decoupled from production since it is paid to agricultural 
producers based on their level of production and, will not be paid in the absence of 
production.218 
However, unlike Amber Box domestic support measures, the Blue Box domestic 
support is not a subject of member’s reduction commitment since outlays on the Blue 
Box are excluded from the calculation of Total AMS.219 Hence, under the Agreement 
on Agriculture, members are entirely free to increase to any extent their outlays on a 
pre-existing Blue Box domestic support or introduce new support measures as long 
as the measures introduced qualify the requirements of Blue Box domestic support 
under Article 6 (5) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Under most of the negotiations preceding the Agreement on Agriculture, domestic 
support measures were categorised as Amber Box and Green Box; it is in the last 
moment of the Uruguay Round of agricultural negotiations that the Blue Box 
domestic support got official recognition as part of the different forms of domestic 
support measures. In the Dunkel proposal of 1991, which is known for laying the 
foundation of the Agreement on Agriculture, the Blue Box domestic support was 
totally not recognised and, domestic support measures were simply grouped into 
Amber and Green Box.220 It is later at the Blair House Agreement between the USA 
and EC that the Blue Box domestic support was introduced as a deal-maker for the 
                                                            
217 Article 6(5) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
218 Desta (2002) 412 
219 Article 6(5)(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
220 Delcros (2002) 235 
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safe accommodation of the domestic support programmes of both the EC and USA 
under the Agreement on Agriculture.221  
Accordingly, the linkage Blue Box domestic support has with production and its 
original introduction as a safety-box for the subsidy programmes of the USA and EC 
creates resentment on the side of most members of the WTO that such a Box is 
nothing more than one way of shielding trade distorting support programmes of rich 
countries.222 It is due to the suspicion they had against the Blue Box domestic 
support measures that most members advocate for a change in discipline of such 
support measures under the current Doha Round of trade negotiations. In fact, in 
their 2003 proposal, the G-20 developing countries went to the extent of suggesting 
the total elimination of Article 6 (5) of the Agreement on Agriculture and thus, Blue 
Box domestic support measures.223 The details as to the new developments in the 
Doha Round on the application of Blue Box domestic support measures will be 
discussed under a subsequent topic. 
The last category of domestic support is the Green Box domestic support measures. 
Under the Agreement on Agriculture, the Green Box domestic support is 
characterised as categories of domestic support measures that ‘have no, or at most 
minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production’.224 Unlike the Amber Box 
domestic support, Green Box domestic support measures do not involve price 
support or a transfer from consumers; need to be decoupled from production and, 
can only be given for the reasons specified under Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
Due to the fact that Green Box domestic support measures have no or little trade 
distorting effect, they can be freely applied by members without any limitation or 
reduction commitment.225 The free application of Green Box domestic support 
measures is allowed to enable members to provide subsidies and support 
programmes for the promotion of social, economic and environmental policies,226 
                                                            
221 Desta (2002) 412 
222 Ibid 
223 See Paragraph 1.1 of the Agriculture – Framework Proposal of the G‐20 Countries, September 2003 
(WT/MIN(03)/W/6 
224 See Paragraph 1 under Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
225 Article 6 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
226 See Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
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most of which policies form part of the multifunctional effects or non-trade concerns 
of agriculture. In this regard, as per Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
members can freely give domestic support for programmes like: research, pest and 
disease control, training services, marketing and promotion services, infrastructural 
services, food security, decoupled income support programmes, income safety-net 
programmes, Structural adjustment assistance, relief from natural disasters, 
environmental programmes and regional assistance programmes. Most of the 
programmes listed above are crucial policy considerations of every government, 
which therefore gives the Green Box support measures an important place in the 
implementation of such policy considerations. 
 
Because the application of Green Box domestic support measures is delinked from 
production and involves important policy considerations, there is a common positive 
stand among members on the free application of such support measures under the 
Agreement on Agriculture. Nonetheless, there is a concern by many developing 
members that some of the programmes labelled under the Green Box domestic 
support might in reality have more than a minimal trade distorting effect.227 For 
instance, under the provision of Green Box domestic support measures in a form of 
direct payment to agricultural producers, even if it’s direct application is ‘decoupled’ 
from production, it will inevitably increase the income of agricultural producers in 
developed countries and thus, rationally, facilitate their productivity at the detriment 
of agricultural producers in resource poor countries. Thus, it is sometimes important 
to look beyond the way support measures are labelled and, to enquire as to the 
actual impact of such support measures on production and trade. This is especially 
important in the existence of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture that excludes 
all Green Box domestic support measures from being subjected to countervailing 
duties, actions under Article XVI of the GATT and, actions based on non-violation 
nullification and impairment of benefits, during the implementation period. It is with 
this concern that most developing members, including the African Group, have 
frequently proposed for the adoption of tighter criteria in the determination of Green 
Box domestic support programmes.228 
                                                            
227 Zunckel (2004) 7 
228 See for instance Paragraph 18 of the WTO African Group: Joint Proposal on the Negotiations on Agriculture, 
March 2001 (G/AG/NG/W/142) 
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3.3.3- Export Subsidies 
Export subsidies are financial contributions made by a government or a public body, 
which contributions confer benefits on and are contingent upon export performance 
of the recipient.229 The term export subsidy is not peculiar under the Agreement on 
Agriculture; it has been well familiarised and used in the same context under the 
GATT, the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and the SCM Agreement. However, the 
discipline of export subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture is far different from 
the discipline under the SCM Agreement, which totally and expressly prohibits the 
application of export subsidies.230  
 
Under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, export subsidies are classified under the 
category of prohibited subsides, the grant or maintenance of which is strictly 
forbidden. Hence, if a member is found applying export subsidies by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, upon initiation of a case by any member, it will be 
recommended to out-rightly withdraw such subsidies and upon failure to do so, will 
be subjected to retaliation by the complainant party.231 Hence, the discipline of 
export subsidies under the SCM Agreement is quite a stringent one. This is 
justifiable because export subsidies by definition are directly related to and 
conditional upon the export performance of the recipient.  
 
Naturally, export subsidies lessen the cost of exportation of products, thereby giving 
recipients the advantage of bringing cheaper products to the world market, as 
compared to the ordinary price of unsubsidised products.232 Hence, it has a direct 
effect of boosting export volume at a depressed price, which therefore is highly trade 
distorting. The adverse effects of agricultural export subsidies is particularly severe 
on developing countries most of which are agricultural exporters but provide no or 
very insignificant amounts of subsidies for their agricultural exports.233 However, 
under the Agreement on Agriculture, the application of export subsidies is far from 
                                                            
229 See Article 1(e) of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 1 of the SCM Agreement 
230 Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement    
231 See Article 6 of the SCM Agreement  
232 Desta (2002) 100 
233 Diaz, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 29 
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being prohibited. It is rather partially restricted in terms of budgetary outlays and 
export volume.234  
       
Export subsidies have a commonality with domestic support measures to the extent 
that both practically fall under the definition of subsidy as per Article 1 of the SCM 
Agreement. However, unlike domestic support measures, export subsidies are 
provided with a view to increase the export capacity of recipients and is always trade 
distorting. Also, while domestic support measures are always given for agricultural 
producers, it is not necessarily the case for export subsidies, which are essentially 
provided in favour of agricultural exporters, who might be producers or just traders.  
 
In the negotiations preceding the Agreement on Agriculture, export subsidies were 
not welcomed by several of the WTO members, even by some of the wealthy states 
that are known for their intense application of subsidies.235 Taking into account its 
absolute trade distorting nature, even if most members were in favour of the total 
prohibition of agricultural export subsidies, the EC, as a major custodian of export 
subsidies, succeeded in the negotiations for the continuing application of agricultural 
export subsidies with only a reduction commitment.236 
 
Accordingly, the Agreement on Agriculture requires developed members to reduce 
their budgetary outlays on export subsidies and their volume of subsidized exports 
by 36% and 21%, respectively, from the amount and volume in the base period of 
1986-1990, while developing members are required to take 2/3 of such reduction 
commitments.237 However, it is worth noting that the Agreement on Agriculture does 
not limit the application of all forms of agricultural export subsidies. It rather makes 
an exclusive list of agricultural export subsidies that are subjected to the above 
mentioned reduction commitments and left the others free for an unlimited 
application.  
 
                                                            
234 See Article 9(2)(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
235 For instance, the US, in its June 1990 proposal, has suggested for the total elimination of agricultural export 
subsidies within five years implementation period.    
236 Delcros (2002) 240   
237 See Articles 3(3), 8 and 9(2)(b)(IV) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
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Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture provides the list of different forms of 
export subsidies that are subjected to the reduction commitments and, the provision 
of which beyond the limit of concession will amount to a violation of the WTO 
rules.238 These agricultural export subsidies are; direct subsidies contingent on 
export performance,  sale or disposal for export of non-commercial stocks of 
agricultural products at a price lower than for a domestic sale, government financed 
payments on the export of an agricultural product, provision of subsidies to reduce 
the costs of marketing agricultural exports, more favourable internal transport and 
freight charges for export shipments than domestic shipments and finally, subsidies 
on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported products.239 So, 
these are the only types of export subsidies in the application of which a state cannot 
exceed its budgetary and volume limit. This practically means, as long as a state can 
prove that its export subsidy does not fall within the list of Article 9 (1), it can freely 
make use of export subsidies on any agricultural product, subject to the anti-
circumvention rule under Article 10 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
 
Under Article 10 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture, members are prohibited from 
applying those export subsidies which are not listed under Article 9 (1) in a manner 
that results in or threatens to lead to circumvention of their export subsidy 
commitments. Strictly speaking, this provision does not create a restriction on the 
application of those export subsidies that are not listed under Article 9 (1); it rather 
strengthens the discipline on those export subsidies which are under the exhaustive 
list of Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture. This is true because, as per the 
merit of Article 10 (1), a member cannot complain against another member for the 
mere fact that the latter has intensively applied any form of export subsidy that is not 
listed under Article 9 (1). To challenge the provision of such a subsidy, there must be 
proof that its application enables or will enable a member to effectively get rid of its 
commitments on the listed export subsidies. Hence, there is no restriction on the 
very application of non-listed export subsidies. 
 
It is very important and interesting to notice that even the discipline for those export 
subsidies that are listed under Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture differs 
                                                            
238 See Articles 3(3) and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
239 See Article 9(1) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
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based on the categories of agricultural products for the export of which such 
subsidies are provided. It is stipulated under Article 3 (3) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture that the application of listed export subsidies within the reduction limit is 
permitted only for those agricultural products which are specified under member’s 
Schedule of commitment. This means, if a state specifies some of its agricultural 
products in its Schedule of commitment, it can continue providing a reduced amount 
of export subsidies under Article 9 (1) for the scheduled agricultural products but, 
cannot give the same export subsidy for its agricultural products which do not form 
part of its Schedule of commitment.  
 
To make it generally simple, the Agreement on Agriculture groups export subsidies 
into two categories - export subsidies listed under Article 9 (1) and export subsidies 
not listed under Article 9 (1). As far as those export subsidies listed under Article 9 
(1) are concerned, they can be applied with limit on scheduled agricultural products 
but, are strictly prohibited for unscheduled agricultural products. In the case of non-
listed export subsidies, there is no reduction commitment and, subject to the anti-
circumvention rule, they can be freely applied on any agricultural product, even on 
unscheduled agricultural products.240  
 
In fact, there are differing opinions as to whether the Agreement on Agriculture 
permits the application of non-listed export subsidies on unscheduled agricultural 
products. Primarily, Article 3 (3) of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that: 
 
...a member shall not provide ‘export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 
of Article 9’ in respect of the agricultural products or groups of 
products specified in section II of part IV of its Schedule in excess 
of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels specified 
therein and shall not provide ‘such subsidies’ in respect of any 
agricultural products not specified in that section of its Schedule.  
  
As it can be clearly understood from the merit of the above provision, which is the 
only provision under the Agreement on Agriculture that talks about the requirement 
                                                            
240 Under Article 3(3) of  the Agreement on Agriculture,  the  requirement of  scheduling  is  stipulated only  in 
relation to export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the same Agreement.     
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of scheduling agricultural products, a distinction is made between scheduled and 
unscheduled agricultural products only in relation to the application of export 
subsidies that are listed under Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Hence, 
there is no specific distinction between scheduled and unscheduled agricultural 
products as far as export subsidies that are not listed under Article 9 (1) are 
concerned and, the discipline for such export subsidies is similar regardless of the 
type of agricultural products involved.  
 
The differing opinion as to the legality of applying non-listed export subsidies on 
unscheduled agricultural products came from the differing interpretation of Article 10 
of the Agreement on Agriculture, which provides that: 
 
Export subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 shall not be 
applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, 
circumvention of ‘export subsidy commitments’; nor shall non-
commercial transactions be used to circumvent such commitments. 
 
Some scholars interpret the phrase ‘export subsidy commitments’ in the above 
provision to mean only reduction commitment - the commitment of members not to 
provide listed export subsidies to scheduled agricultural products in excess of the 
scheduled reduction level.241 This line of interpretation excludes the commitment of 
members not to provide at all listed export subsidies to unscheduled agricultural 
products from the scope of ‘export subsidy commitments’ under Article 10 (1) and 
thus, from the rule of anti-circumvention in the application of non-listed export 
subsidies. This means, given the fact that Article 10 (1) is the only provision that 
expressly permits, though indirectly, the application of non-listed export subsidies, 
the permission to apply non-listed export subsidies is only limited to scheduled 
agricultural products, they being the only subjects of reduction commitment. In favour 
of this line of interpretation, one scholar argues: 
 
...one can talk of circumvention of commitments only if the non-
listed export subsidies are used on a scheduled product that is 
                                                            
241 Desta (2002) 237‐8 
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subject to a commitment in respect of the listed export subsidies. To 
the extent that no such commitment exists in respect of a given 
product, it is difficult to talk of circumvention. Consequently, within 
these limits, non-scheduled agricultural products fall outside the 
scope of Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture.242 
 
Here, the question is: are the unscheduled agricultural products really excluded from 
the scope of Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture or from the scope of 
application of non-listed export subsidies? To answer this question, the core issue 
worth addressing is to find out the meaning of the phrase ‘export subsidy 
commitments’ under Article 10 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, captioned as ‘Incorporation of concessions 
and commitments’, defines the major commitments of members in the areas of 
agricultural domestic support and export subsidies. Under Article 3 (3) of the same 
Agreement, the export subsidy commitments of members are defined as: the 
commitment not to provide export subsidies listed in Article 9 (1) in respect of 
scheduled agricultural products in excess of budgetary outlay and quantity 
commitment levels and, the commitment not to provide at all the same subsidies in 
respect of unscheduled agricultural products. This means, under Article 10 (1) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, members are required not to apply non-listed export 
subsidies in a manner that circumvents their commitments on scheduled agricultural 
products and on those that are not scheduled as well. Hence, the permission for the 
provision of non-listed export subsidies, inferred from Article 10 (1) of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, is equally applicable both on scheduled and unscheduled agricultural 
products. In fact, this line of interpretation is supported by the Appellate Body in US–
FSC,243 which Appellate Body states that: 
 
In our view, the terms "export subsidy commitments" and "reduction 
commitments" have different meanings. "Reduction commitments" 
is a narrower term than "export subsidy commitments" and refers 
only to commitments made, under the first clause of Article 3.3, with 
                                                            
242 Ibid  
243 United States – Tax Treatment For “Foreign Sales Corporations”  (WT/DS108/AB/R) / DSR 2000:III, 1619 
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respect to scheduled agricultural products... The term "export 
subsidy commitments" has a wider reach that covers commitments 
and obligations relating to both scheduled and unscheduled 
agricultural products.244 
 
The requirement of scheduling agricultural products is introduced with a view to 
prevent expansion in the application of agricultural export subsidies by limiting them 
only for those members which make a specification and those agricultural products 
specified in member’s schedule of commitment.245 But, when we see the reality in 
the mid 1990’s, 83% of the world export subsidies were given by the EC, while the 
USA, Norway and Switzerland gave 98% of the remaining 17%.246 All these major 
providers of export subsidies have already scheduled most of their agricultural 
products in their schedule of commitment, and thus are allowed to keep on granting 
export subsidy in a reduced amount.247 Hence, the restriction is essentially effective 
on those members which have no or a very insignificant share in the provision of 
agricultural export subsidies. This logically creates a legitimate doubt as to the 
relevance of the requirement of scheduling in restricting the provision of export 
subsidies, given the major providers are still in play.  
 
The entire regulatory discipline of export subsidies under the Agreement on 
Agriculture is best analyzed in US - FSC, in which the US tax regime that exempts 
the foreign trade income of Foreign Sales Corporations from the payment of income 
tax was challenged by the EC. The USA provided tax exemption only for Foreign 
Sales Corporations which are engaged in the sale of US products in foreign 
countries and only to the extent of their income earned from the export of US 
products.248 The EC challenged the act of USA as a provision of export subsidy in 
violation of the SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
Taking into account the fact that tax exemption is a practice of forgoing government 
revenue that is otherwise due, it was obvious, in fact found by the Panel and upheld 
                                                            
244 Paragraph 147 of the Appellate Body Report on US – FSC case  
245 Desta (2002) 235 
246 Anderson in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 46 
247 Desta (2006) 19  
248 Paragraph 11 of the Appellate Body Report on US – FSC case   
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by the Appellate Body, that USA was providing subsidy as per the definition of 
subsidy under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.249 Besides, given the fact that the tax 
exemption was given only in favour of Foreign Sales Corporations and only for their 
export-related earnings, the subsidy falls under the definition of export subsidy – a 
subsidy contingent upon export performance.250 After establishing the existence of 
export subsidy, the next question worth asking is whether the application of this 
particular export subsidy is in violation of the discipline of export subsidies under the 
Agreement on Agriculture? In this regard, the Panel sets two criteria to determine if 
there is any violation of Article 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture. These are: 1) the 
export subsidy at issue must fall within the list of export subsidies contained under 
Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture and, 2) the export subsidy must be in 
excess of the reduction commitment levels for scheduled products, or provided at 
any level for unscheduled products.251 
 
In its findings, the Panel classified US’s tax exemption regime as an export subsidy 
provided to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural products under 
Article 9 (1) (d). Accordingly, the Panel held that USA violates its obligation under 
Article 3 (3) of the Agreement on Agriculture by the mere provision of export subsidy 
covered under Article 9 (1) for unscheduled agricultural products and by the 
provision of the same subsidy for scheduled agricultural products in excess of its 
commitment level.252 
 
The matter became more interesting when the Appellate Body, upon challenge by 
the USA, reversed the Panel’s finding of labelling the US income tax exemption 
regime as an ‘export subsidy provided to reduce the costs of marketing exports’ 
under Article 9 (1) (d) of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Appellate Body 
considered the different costs of marketing as specific costs while it took tax liability 
as a general cost of business.253 In reversing the Panel’s finding in the categorisation 
of the US income tax exemption as an export subsidy provided to reduce the costs of 
marketing exports, the Appellate Body stated that: 
                                                            
249 Ibid, Paragraphs 90‐5   
250 Ibid, Paragraphs 121 and 141 
251 Paragraph 7.145 of the Panel Report on US – FSC case  
252 Ibid, Paragraph 7.159 
253 Paragraphs 129‐30 of the Appellate Body Report on US – FSC case  
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Income tax liability under the FSC measures can also be viewed 
as related to the business of marketing exports only in the very 
broadest sense. Income tax liability under the FSC measures 
arises only when goods are actually sold for export, that is, when 
they have been the subject of successful marketing....if income 
tax liability arising from export sales can be viewed as among the 
"costs of marketing exports", then so too can virtually any other 
cost incurred by a business engaged in exporting. This cannot be 
what was intended by Article 9.1(d).254 
 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded that the US tax exemption regime forms 
part of export subsidy measures that are not listed under Article 9 (1) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture.255 This obviously affected the whole findings of the Panel 
as far as Agricultural products are concerned since members do not have reduction 
commitments in the case of agricultural export subsidies that are not listed under 
Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Rather, the Appellate Body found that 
the ‘absence of limitation on the amount of exemption’ and lack of ‘discretion on the 
side of the USA government’ on the application of the tax exemption provide 
members with a way that threatens to lead to circumvention of their obligations on 
the provision of export subsidies listed under Article 9 (1) both on scheduled and 
unscheduled agricultural products, 256 which therefore is a violation of Article 10 (1) 
of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
3.4- Trade in Agricultural Products under the Doha Round 
The mandate for a post-Uruguay agricultural trade negotiation is derived from Article 
20 of the Agreement on Agriculture which requires the initiation of new agricultural 
trade talks immediately before the end of the implementation period under the 
Agreement. Accordingly, the ongoing Doha Round, which was launched at the fourth 
WTO Ministerial Conference in November 2001, places trade in agriculture as one of 
its core work programmes. In affirming the placement of agricultural issues in the 
                                                            
254 Ibid, Paragraph 131 
255 Ibid, Paragraph 142  
256 Ibid, Paragraphs 149‐53 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Doha Round negotiating agenda and setting the overall objective of the Round on 
agricultural negotiations, the Doha Ministerial Declaration provides: 
 
...Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging 
the outcome of the negotiations, we commit ourselves to 
comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improvements in 
market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms 
of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support...257 
Though the Doha Ministerial Declaration sets March 2003 as the deadline for the 
establishment of all the modalities for further commitments,258 members did not find 
it that easy to reach an agreement on any modality by the due date.259 It is later in 
the 2004 Doha Work Programme260 and the subsequent 2005 Doha Work 
Programme261 that the frameworks for agricultural modalities have been developed. 
These two Work Programmes came up with various frameworks of modalities on 
agricultural market access, domestic support and export subsidies, which 
frameworks are substantially different from the disciplines under the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
 
In respect of agricultural market access, an agreement has been reached for the 
reduction of tariffs from the bound tariff rates that resulted after the implementation of 
market access commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture.262 However, unlike 
the Agreement on Agriculture in which a linear cut is made from the average 
agricultural tariff rate, the framework Agreements set for tariff reduction using a 
tiered formula with four tariff bands.263 The tiered formula is more efficient than a 
linear cut in that under the former, the rate of reduction gets higher with an increment 
                                                            
257 Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration  
258 Paragraph 14 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration  
259  The  draft  modalities  prepared  by  the  chairman  of  the  Agricultural  Committee  immediately  before  the 
deadline – the Harbinson Draft, March 2003 (TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1) – failed to get the consensus of all members , 
leaving them with no agreement on the deadline 
260 Doha Work Program, Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, (WT/L/579)  
261 Doha Work Program, Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005, (WT/MIN(05)/DEC) 
262 Paragraph 29 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Program 
263 See paragraph 28 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Program and paragraph 7 of the 2005 Doha Work 
Program  
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on tariff rates, thereby deeply affecting high tariffs,264 which are greatly prevalent in 
the world agricultural market due to dirty tariffication and other downsides of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
 
There are, however, some other formulas, like the Swiss Formula, which have a 
more rigorous effect than the tiered formula in deeply reducing high tariffs and 
harmonising different tariff lines.265 In fact, tariff reduction for non-agricultural market 
access is agreed to be made using a Swiss Formula with a view to ‘reduce or 
eliminate tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation’.266 Hence, the tiered formula 
will provide a relatively moderate liberalisation for agricultural market access, as 
compared to the Swiss Formula cut for non-agricultural market access; but will 
noticeably provide a deeper tariff reduction than the linear cut under the Agreement 
on Agriculture.        
 
Besides, unlike the overall average cut under the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
tiered formula subjects each tariff line to a particular percentage of tariff reduction 
depending on the band under which the tariff line falls. This will reduce the discretion 
of members to decide on the rate of reduction over individual tariff lines and thus, 
their potential to manipulate the system in favour of their sensitive agricultural 
products. However, no determination is made under the framework Agreements on 
the thresholds for each of the four tariff bands and the percentage cut therein. 
Though, different proposals were made in the post-Hong Kong period,267 no 
agreement has yet been reached over the threshold points and the rate of reduction. 
 
In addition to the Special Agricultural Safeguard exception under the Agreement on 
Agriculture, the Doha Round came up with various exceptions from tariff reduction 
commitment of members in the form of flexibilities for sensitive and special 
agricultural Products and, through Special Safeguard Mechanisms.268 Accordingly, 
while all members are given the flexibility to designate certain tariff lines as sensitive 
                                                            
264 See paragraph 29 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Program, see also Desta (2006) 7 and 12 
265 Hoekman and Michalopoulos in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 545    
266 Paragraph 14 of the 2005 Doha Work Program  
267  See  the  June  2006,  July  2007  and  July  2008  draft modalities  on  agriculture,  all  of which  came  up with 
different proposals on the thresholds and rate of tariff reduction    
268 See paragraphs 31, 41 and 42 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Program and paragraph 7 of the 2005 
Doha Work Program  
 
 
 
 
68 
 
products and deviate, to a certain level, from the ordinary tariff cut on such tariff 
lines, developing members are provided with an additional flexibility to designate 
some special products for a lesser rate of tariff reduction.269 Special Safeguard 
Mechanism is also a developing country version of Special Agricultural Safeguard, 
which Special Safeguard Mechanism is triggered by an import surge or a price fall in 
the market of developing members.270 
 
However, both the 2004 and 2005 Work Programmes have failed to determine 
various issues including: the number of tariff lines that can be designated by 
members as sensitive or special agricultural products and the extent of deviation 
available from the ordinary rate of tariff reduction; the point of trigger in an import 
surge or a price fall for the application of Special Safeguard Mechanism and, the 
extent of tariff deviation allowed as a safeguard measure. Even though, different 
proposals were made each year from 2006 up to 2008 in respect of the above 
market access issues,271 none of them succeeded in bringing members into an 
agreement. In fact, the point of trigger for the application of Special Safeguard 
Mechanism and, the extent of tariff deviation therein served as the immediate cause 
for the collapse of the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial Conference,272 which left everything 
in vain.273 
 
Regarding the domestic support pillar of agricultural trade, the Doha Round has 
brought some significant changes over the Uruguay Round disciplines. Primarily, in 
addition to reduction of outlays on AMS, which essentially is the Amber Box 
domestic support, the Doha Round introduces a reduction of outlays on the Overall 
Trade Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS), which is the sum of all outlays on Amber 
Box domestic support (AMS), de minimis level of trade distorting domestic support 
                                                            
269 As per paragraph 41 in Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Program, agricultural products can be designated as 
special products based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs.   
270 See paragraph 7 of the 2005 Doha Work Program 
271 The three proposals made from 2006 up to 2008 are: the Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, 22 June 
2006  (JOB(06)/199);  the Draft Modalities  for Agriculture, 17  July 2007  (JOB(07)/128) and;  the Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture, July 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3) 
272 Among  the G‐7  countries, while developing members propose 15%  import  surge as  the minimal  trigger 
point, developed members had proposed the trigger point to be 40%. 
273 Even though an agreement was reached on significant part of the deal, a disagreement on few  issues  left 
the whole deal in vain because of the principle of single undertaking under the WTO ‐ nothing is agreed unless 
everything is agreed. 
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and, the Blue Box domestic support.274 In the existence of a reduction discipline over 
AMS, the major relevance of introducing a limitation on OTDS is controlling the Blue 
Box domestic support measures the application of which was freely authorised under 
the Agreement on Agriculture. Hence, the introduction of limitation on OTDS outlays 
will to some extent address the concern of many members on the unlimited 
application and adverse effects of the Blue Box domestic support measures, which 
has been discussed under the previous section. 
 
The reduction of outlays on AMS and OTDS, alike the framework Agreement for tariff 
reduction, is agreed to be made using a tiered formula but, with three bands.275 Here 
also, even though no agreement has yet been reached over the threshold outlays for 
each band and the percentage reduction therein, there is at least a consensus that a 
member with the highest level of support will be in the top band, the two members 
with the second and third highest levels of support will be in the middle band and, all 
the other members will fall in the bottom band.276 As to the notifications made to the 
WTO Committee on Agriculture, the EC, Japan and USA form the three highest 
providers of domestic support; EC being the highest provider of trade distorting 
domestic support will fall in the top band and, the remaining two members will fall in 
the middle band.277 This makes sense because the above three members provide 
the significant amount of domestic support outlays, which account for around 95% of 
the total domestic support outlays notified to the WTO Committee on Agriculture.278 
Hence, a deeper cut in the domestic support outlays of these three members will 
alone bring a significant reform in world agricultural trade.       
 
As far as export subsidies are concerned, a notable development has been achieved 
during the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in which members have agreed for the 
total elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies by year 2013.279 Here, it 
is worth noting that the framework Agreement, unlike the Agreement on Agriculture, 
                                                            
274 See Paragraph 7 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Program   
275 See paragraphs 7‐9 under Annex A of  the 2004 Doha Work Program and paragraph 5 of  the 2005 Doha 
Work Program  
276 Paragraph 5 of the 2005 Doha Work Program  
277 The bound AMS outlay of the EC, USA and Japan  is 67.2 million Euro, 19.1 million dollars and 3.97 billion 
yen. See <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm> [accessed on 7 January 2009]    
278 Josling in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 36  
279 Paragraph 6 of the 2005 Doha Work Program  
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makes no distinction among the different forms of agricultural export subsidies, 
thereby setting the year 2013 for the elimination of all forms of agricultural export 
subsidies. Moreover, based on the mandate set under Article 10 (2) of the 
Agreement on Agriculture for the development of internationally agreed disciplines 
over export credits, export credit guarantees and insurance programmes, the Hong 
Kong Declaration requires such schemes to be self-financing, applicable in 
accordance with market consistency and of shorter duration – 180 days and 
shorter.280 
 
In general, though series of Doha Round trade negotiations were undertaken up to 
this date, nothing concrete is achieved more than the two framework Agreements. In 
this regard, the latest and a highly comprehensive Doha Round modalities 
negotiation was undertaken in the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial Conference, which 
however was not successful to bring members into an agreement. Hence, 
agricultural trade, which was subjected to trade distorting practices in the GATT 
regime and, a modest liberalisation process in the Uruguay Round, still persists in 
contest. In reflecting the importance of a Doha Round progress for agricultural 
exporters, especially for developing and least-developed members, the EC Trade 
Commissioner – Mr. Peter Mandelson - stated that: 
 
...we needed the Doha Round to lock in the openness we have 
benefited from over the last decade. For developing world, 
especially the poor, lose of the deal [in the Mini-Ministerial 
Conference] is loss of the last opportunity to secure farm subsidy 
reform in the developed world; that alone is a development 
tragedy.281  
 
3.5- Conclusion 
Beginning with the GATT exceptions on agricultural market access and export 
subsidies, the disciplines for trade in agricultural products have faced various 
deviations from the general principles of the multilateral trading system. Due to the 
                                                            
280 Ibid 
281 Taken from the speech of Mr. Peter Mandelson, EC Trade Commissioner, at a press conference on 29 July 
2008. Available at <http://www.wto.org>  [accessed on 18 September 2008]   
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different interests attached to agriculture that countries want to protect, trade in 
agricultural products is exceptionally subjected to a greater degree of border 
protection and trade distorting support programmes, as compared to the support and 
protection provided for non-agricultural products. Such higher degree of agricultural 
protection and support have become developmental concerns of most developing 
countries due to the fact that such countries have a comparative advantage and an 
export interest in agricultural commodities and thus, are looking for a freer trading 
arrangement.  
A reform process towards a freer agricultural trading system has started with the 
adoption of the Agreement on Agriculture which brought separate and new 
disciplines on agricultural market access, domestic support and export subsidies. 
Though members have taken commitments, under the Agreement on Agriculture, for 
the reduction of agricultural tariffs, outlays on trade distorting domestic support and 
export subsidies, the net trade liberalising effect of the reform process was modest 
due to different snags under the Agreement on Agriculture. 
In the current Doha Round of trade negotiations, trade in agricultural products is 
given an important place with a view to further liberalise the world agricultural market 
in favour of developing countries and fulfil the mandate under Article 20 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. Though different attempts were made to conclude a Doha 
Round agricultural Agreement, nothing concrete is yet achieved other than the 2004 
and 2005 framework Agreements which lay down the general formula for the 
reduction of tariffs, AMS and OTDS and, set the year 2013 for the elimination of 
agricultural export subsidies. With the collapse of the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial 
Conference, mainly because of agricultural matters, trade in agricultural products still 
continues to be among the most contentious areas of the multilateral trading system.              
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CHAPTER IV – SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL  
TREATMENT FOR TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERESTS OF AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
4.1- The Role of Agriculture and Trade in Agricultural Products in 
the Economy of African Countries 
Of all the economic sectors, agriculture has a central role in the economic growth 
and social welfare of most developing countries.282 Due to the larger share 
agriculture has in the national income, employment and export earnings of most 
developing countries, an overall economic development in such countries is highly 
reliant on a positive trend in agricultural growth.283 According to a report by the 
Director-General of the WTO in 2005, agriculture accounts for one fourth of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs half of the economically active 
population in most developing countries.284 It is this strong link agriculture has with 
the overall economy of most developing countries, coupled with the comparative 
advantage such countries have in agricultural trade,285 that give the agricultural 
sector a prominent place in the economic and developmental prospects of most 
developing countries. 
Particularly in Africa, most countries have a comparative advantage in the production 
and export of agricultural commodities due to the abundance of natural resources 
and un-skilled labour force in such countries that best fit the agricultural sector.286 
Besides, agriculture serves as a major employer; a significant source of income, 
export and rural livelihood as well as a stimulant for other economic sectors in most 
African countries.287 
                                                            
282 McCalla and Nash in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 2 
283 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 2 
284 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 22 
285 Hoekman in Guha‐Khasnobis (ed) (2004) 18 
286 World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (2007) 35 
287 See Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the WTO African Group Joint Proposal on the Negotiations on Agriculture, March 
2001 (G/AG/NG/W/142) 
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As to a study made by the FAO for the year 2004, the average contribution of 
agriculture in the total GDP of African countries is around 26.3%.288 But this figure, 
being an average estimate, does not reflect the considerably high economic 
dependence of some African countries on agriculture. For instance, in the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, 
agricultural GDP covers more than half of each country’s total GDP.289 
Agriculture is also a major employer in Africa, where an average 58.8% of the 
economically active population is engaged in agricultural production.290 Given the 
agrarian economy most African countries have, the employment share of agriculture 
goes beyond 80% in countries like: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Niger and Ruanda.291 The above figures indicate the big role 
agriculture plays in the economy of most African counties and the relatively greater 
dependence of the population in such countries on the Agricultural sector, as 
compared to the situation in most developed countries.292  
Moreover, an average 61% of the population in most African countries live in rural 
areas where agriculture is the main source of living.293 In some African countries like: 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda, the rural population accounts for 
more than 80% of the total population.294  Greater dependence of the African rural 
population on agricultural activities makes growth in the agricultural sector an 
indispensable factor for a growth in the income and living standard of this majority 
section of the rural society.295 
Agricultural growth also plays an indispensable role in the alleviation of poverty, 
given the fact that a higher level of poverty is prevalent in the large rural 
population.296 As to the 2008 World Development Report, three of every four poor 
people in developing countries live in rural areas, being dependent on agriculture for 
                                                            
288 <http://www.fao.org/ES/ess/yearbook/vol_1_1/pdf/g02.pdf> [accessed on 24 January 2009] 
289 Ibid 
290 <http://www.fao.org/ES/ess/yearbook/vol_1_1/pdf/a03.pdf> [accessed on 25 January 2009] 
291 Ibid 
292  For  instance,  in  the USA  and  Japan,  agriculture  accounts only  for 2%  and  3%,  respectively, of  the  total 
employment and 1% of both countries’ GDP for the year 2004   
293 <http://www.fao.org/ES/ess/yearbook/vol_1_1/pdf/a02.pdf> [accessed on 24 January 2009] 
294 Ibid 
295 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 4 
296 Id, 2 and 4 
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a livelihood.297 Particularly in Africa, it is estimated that 82% of the rural population 
lives under poverty.298 Hence, agriculture, being a major employer of the African 
rural population, plays a crucial role in the promotion of rural development and 
alleviation of poverty in the continent. In asserting this fact, one writer states: 
If the development community had to choose just one activity with 
which to address the first MDG of reducing extreme poverty and 
hunger in Africa, it should be to produce more food.299 
Furthermore, agricultural trade plays a considerable role in the overall economy of 
most African countries. In an estimate done for the year 2004, the average share of 
agricultural exports in the total merchandise export of Africa was around 26.6%.300 
For some African countries like Benin, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Malawi, the 
share of agricultural exports exceeds even two thirds of the total merchandise 
export.301 Given the natural comparative advantage most African countries have in 
agriculture and their low level of industrial development, it is not a surprise to see 
agricultural exports playing a considerable role in the economy of most African 
countries. 
Despite the economic dependence of most African countries on agriculture and 
engagement of the majority section of the society in agricultural activities, the share 
of the continent in the world total agricultural export is too small. In the year 2004, 
Africa contributed only 3.22% to the total world agricultural exports.302 If the 
contribution of individual countries to the above figure is examined, agricultural 
exports from five African countries accounted for 53.4% of the total agricultural 
exports of the continent,303 while agricultural exports from South Africa alone 
accounted for 17.7% of the continent’s total share in the world agricultural export. 
This indicates the fact that the relative agricultural export performance of the 
continent is too small and, even this small amount is dominated by very few African 
countries. 
                                                            
297 World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (2007) 26 
298 World Bank Assistance for Agriculture in Sub‐Saharan Africa: An IEG Review (2007) 3  
299 Hartmann in World Bank Assistance for Agriculture in Sub‐Saharan Africa: An IEG Review (2007) 4 
300 <http://www.fao.org/ES/ess/yearbook/vol_1_1/pdf/c03.pdf> [accessed on 25 January 2009] 
301 Ibid 
302 <http://www.fao.org/statistics/yearbook/vol_1_1/pdf/c02.pdf> [accessed on 24 January 2009] 
303 These five African countries are: Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa  
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Besides, an examination of the export performance of Africa over the past three 
decades shows that its share in the world agricultural export is in a declining trend, 
falling from 5.75% in 1979/80 to 3.59% in 1989/90 and then to 3.22% in 2004.304 In 
general, the agricultural export share of Africa in the world trade is too small, which 
share is largely dominated by few countries and is also in a declining trend; 
facilitating marginalisation of the continent in world trade.305 This raises a legitimate 
question as to how the agricultural export share of Africa is getting smaller while the 
continent has a natural comparative advantage in agricultural production and trade.  
Different factors have made their own contribution to the diminution of the export 
share of Africa in the world trade. The maintenance of high agricultural tariffs, tariff 
peaks and tariff escalation by most of the developed countries, which are the major 
destinations for agricultural exports of Africa, are among the principal impediments 
on the agricultural export growth of the continent.306 As it was examined in chapter 
III, most developed countries impose higher tariffs on agricultural imports as 
compared to the tariffs applied on non-agricultural products. For instance in the EC, 
where the majority of African agricultural commodities are exported,307 the simple 
average MFN applied tariff rate on agricultural imports is 15.1%, while the average 
applied tariff on non-agricultural imports is only 3.9%.308 The maintenance of high 
agricultural tariffs by major importing countries is detrimental to the trade interests of 
most African countries as agricultural exporters, since such high tariffs will increase 
the price of agricultural exports from Africa over the domestic price of agricultural 
commodities in importing countries, putting the former at a competitive 
disadvantage.309 
Particularly, the escalating nature of tariffs in most developed countries together with 
the level of processing of agricultural imports play a big role in discouraging 
developing countries from venturing into the production and export of high value 
agricultural products and agro-industrial activities that would have enhanced the total 
value of agricultural exports and the share of agricultural GDP in the total GDP of 
                                                            
304 <http://www.fao.org/statistics/yearbook/vol_1_1/pdf/c02.pdf> [accessed on 24 January 2009] 
305 Diao, Dorosh and Rahman (2003) 6 
306 Nyangito (2004) 7 
307 Agricultural  Trade  Performance  by Developing  Countries  1990‐99:  Background  Paper  by  the  Secretariat 
Revision, January 2001 (G/AG/NG/S/6/Rev.1) 9  
308 World Tariff Profiles 2006 (2007) 78 
309 Diao, Dorosh and Rahman (2003) 15 
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such countries.310 This is of a particular concern for most African countries which are 
greatly dependent on the production and export of primary agricultural commodities 
that are subjects of high price volatility and depression in the world market.311 
Quantifying the benefit of African countries from agricultural trade liberalisation in 
developed countries, one study has projected that the Sub-Saharan Africa will gain a 
14% increase in its non-oil exports if the QUAD countries (USA, EU, Japan and 
Canada) eliminate their trade barriers facing Africa’s exports.312     
However, it is important to note that the average bound agricultural tariffs are also 
higher in most developing countries,313 especially in Africa,314 the reduction of which 
can be considered as a negotiating coin by such countries to get an increased 
access to the world agricultural market. 
The other major barrier to agricultural export growth in Africa is the broad application 
of agricultural support programs in most developed countries and the resulting 
distortion in the world agricultural market.315 Most developed countries provide 
generous domestic support and agricultural export subsidies that have a general 
effect of depressing the world price for agricultural commodities, at the detriment of 
unsubsidised agricultural products of poor countries which are being knocked out of 
the world and their own domestic market by cheaper subsidised exports.316 This is a 
serious setback for agricultural export growth in Africa where government spending 
on agricultural production and export is too low while the production tax farmers are 
required to pay, is higher.317 As to an average estimate done by the World Bank in 
2007, only 4% of the total governmental spending in African countries goes to the 
agricultural sector.318 This figure is too small as compared to the total agricultural 
spending in OECD countries, which is more than twice the total value of agricultural 
                                                            
310 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 10 
311 Paragraph 1 of the Modalities for Negotiations on Agricultural Commodity Issues, A proposal Submitted by 
the African Group to the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, June 2006 (TN/AG/GEN/18)   
312 Osakwe in Morrison and Sarris (eds) (2007) 345 
313 Michalopoulos (1999) 16 
314 There is an average of more than 50% overhang or gap between the average bound and applied agricultural 
tariff rate in Africa. See Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 350‐2  
315 Zunckel (2004) 1 
316 Diao, Dorosh and Rahman (2003) VII 
317 Bach and Andersen (2008) 2 
318 World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (2007) 40 
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exports from all developing countries.319 This generally indicates how little 
agricultural producers and exporters in African countries are supported by their 
governments and how much they will be affected by the generous support programs 
of developed countries. 
Besides trade protectionism and agricultural support programmes of most developed 
countries, the other major factor that has contributed to the decline in the agricultural 
export share of Africa is the low level of agricultural productivity or supply side 
constraint that is greatly prevalent in the continent.320 Unlike the large scale 
mechanised farming schemes that are widely practiced in most developed and some 
high income developing countries, agricultural production is predominantly a small 
scale and ‘private family activity’ in most African countries.321 Because of under 
utilisation of irrigation in Africa,322 agricultural production is highly dependent on 
natural rainfall and, is exposed to climatic variability in most parts of the continent.323 
Hence, the predominance of small scale subsistence farming and its high 
dependence on nature has resulted in the prevalence of low agricultural productivity 
and food insecurity in Africa which in turn have a negative implication on the 
agricultural export performance of the continent. 
The other related problem of most African countries is a greater dependence on the 
export of less-diversified primary agricultural commodities.324 It is estimated in one 
study that the export of nine Agricultural commodities – banana, cocoa, coffee, 
cotton, groundnuts, rubber, sugar, tea and tobacco – accounts for 71% of the total 
agricultural exports from Sub-Saharan Africa.325 There are even some African 
countries whose agricultural export is greatly dependent on a single agricultural 
commodity.326 This increases the vulnerability of African countries to price 
depression and volatility in the world market since any fluctuation in the world price 
                                                            
319<http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.phpaid/551/why_agriltural_trade_liberalisation_matters.ht
ml> [accessed on 6 January 2009]  
320 Aksoy and Beghin in Aksoy and Beghin (eds) (2005) 4 
321 World Bank Assistance to Agriculture in Sub‐Saharan Africa: An IEG Review (2007) 9 
322 Only 4% of the total cropped land in Africa is irrigated. See Africa Development Indicators (2006) 12    
323 Id, 14‐5 
324 Carl (2001) 19 
325 Nyangito (2004) 4 
326 For instance, tobacco accounts for 70‐75% of Malawi’s total agricultural export; coffee accounts for 70% of 
Uganda’s  total agricultural export and, cotton accounts  for 65% of Mali’s  total agricultural export. See Diao, 
Dorosh and Rahman (2003) 14 
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of these dominant agricultural commodities will significantly affect the overall export 
value of agriculture and economic growth in such countries. For instance, between 
the years 1997 and 2001, the world price of coffee, cotton, cocoa, sugar and tea, all 
of which are dominant exports of Africa, have faced a depression by 66%, 39%, 
30%, 24% and 17%, respectively, which depression has caused a distress in the 
economy of those African countries that depend on the export of one or more of the 
above mentioned agricultural commodities.327 
Based on the above enquiry, the following two sections will examine the various 
forms of special and differential treatment provisions under agricultural trade 
disciplines and their effectiveness in addressing the above mentioned agricultural 
trade and developmental interests of African countries.                                           
4.2- Major Special and Differential Treatment Clauses under 
Agricultural Trade Rules 
As discussed in chapter II, developing countries are provided with various forms of 
special and differential treatment under the GATT and in the different Agreements 
under the WTO. As far as agricultural trade is concerned, Article 21 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture affirms the continued application, on agricultural trade 
matters, of the GATT 1994 and other multilateral trade Agreements under Annex 1A 
of the WTO Agreement, subject to the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Hence, unless otherwise expressly provided or practically excluded, all special and 
differential treatment provisions under the GATT and Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreements have an application on trade in agricultural products. In this section, a 
particular emphasis will be paid to those special and differential treatment clauses 
which have a specific application on trade in agricultural products. 
Though, almost all trade sectors of developing countries earn benefits from the 
application of special and differential treatment, an effective application of special 
and differential treatment on trade in agricultural products is of a crucial concern for 
most developing countries.328 This is because, the central rationale behind special 
and differential treatment is to enhance the trade capacity of developing countries for 
                                                            
327 UNCTAD, 2001 
328 Special and differential treatment  for developing countries  in the Agreement  for Agriculture,   A Paper by 
India in a Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, 4‐6 February 2002  
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their effective integration in the world trading system;329 and, agricultural trade is the 
area in which most developing countries have a greater trade and developmental 
interest.330 Accordingly, paragraph 6 under the preamble of the Agreement on 
Agriculture asserts the central place special and differential treatment provisions 
have in agricultural trade by making such provisions an integral part of agricultural 
trade negotiations. 
The Agreement on Agriculture incorporates both of the two major categories of 
special and differential treatment that are examined under section 2.4 – special and 
differential treatments which involve the positive action of developed members and 
special and differential treatments in the form of lesser and flexible obligations on 
developing members. 
As a part of the first category of special and differential treatment, the preamble of 
the Agreement on Agriculture calls developed members to ‘take fully into account the 
particular needs and conditions of developing country members by providing for a 
greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of 
particular interest’ to developing countries.331 To this effect, developed countries are 
called to undertake a full liberalisation of trade on tropical agricultural products and 
other products of particular importance to developing countries in the diversification 
of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops.332 
Though, a general recognition is made of the need for an increased and preferential 
trading arrangement in favour of major agricultural exports of developing countries, 
no Article is devoted under the Agreement on Agriculture to give an enforceable 
nature to the general and discretionary statement under its preamble. The idea of 
fullest liberalisation of trade in tropical and diversification products by developed 
countries has been also identified in the 2004 framework Agreement as one of the 
central issues of the Doha Round agricultural negotiations,333 which however is not 
yet concluded.334 
                                                            
329 Kessie in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 13 
330 McCalla and Nash in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 2 
331 Paragraph 5 under the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture   
332 Ibid 
333 Paragraph 43 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Programme   
334 Under Paragraphs 138‐39 of the Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, a deeper reduction of tariffs on 
tropical and diversification products is proposed in addition to the tiered formula cut    
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Most of the special and differential treatment provisions under the Agreement on 
Agriculture form part of the second category of special and differential treatment 
which authorises developing members to undertake lesser commitments with greater 
flexibilities. Accordingly, under almost all the disciplines of agricultural market 
access, domestic support and export subsidies, developing members are provided 
with some forms of flexibilities as a policy space. 
Under agricultural market access, developing members are allowed to make various 
deviations from the general principles of ‘no application of non-tariff barriers and an 
average 36%, with a minimum 15%, reduction of agricultural tariffs over six years of 
implementation period’.335 Primarily, developing members are given the flexibility, 
subject to the requirements under Annex 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, to 
maintain non-tariff barriers over primary agricultural commodities that are 
predominant staples in the traditional diet of such countries.336 This flexibility forms 
an exception from the general restriction on the introduction or maintenance of non-
tariff barriers under Article 4 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Besides, developing countries are allowed to change their unbound tariff lines with 
ceiling bindings and then, undertake only two thirds of the ordinary tariff reduction 
commitment; that is a 24% average tariff reduction commitment with a 10% minimum 
cut over 10 years of implementation period.337 This enables most developing 
members to adopt high ceiling bindings with lower reduction commitment, thereby 
keeping their agricultural bound tariffs at a higher rate.338 As a result, the average 
Post-Uruguay agricultural bound tariff in developing countries has been estimated to 
be around 60%, which is four times greater than the average agricultural bound tariff 
of developed countries on the same period.339 
Under the two framework Agreements, concluded subsequent to the Agreement on 
Agriculture, developing members are provided with a wider range of flexibility even to 
deviate from their relatively smaller tariff reduction commitment through the 
                                                            
335  See Articles 4(2)  and 15(2) of  the Agreement on Agriculture  and  Paragraph 5 of  the Modalities  for  the 
Establishment  of  Specific  Binding  Commitments  under  the  Reform  Programme,  December  1993 
(MTN/GNG/MA/W/24)    
336 Section B, Paragraph 7 under Annex 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
337  See  Paragraph  15  of  the Modalities  for  the  Establishment  of  Specific  Binding  Commitments  under  the 
Reform Programme, December 1993 (MTN/GNG/MA/W/24) and Article 15(2) of the Agreement on Agriculture   
338 Gallagher (2000) 42  
339 Matthews (2001) 79 
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designation of some special agricultural products or the application of Special 
Safeguard Mechanisms. In recognition of their rural development and food security 
concerns, flexibility is given for developing members to make a certain deviation from 
their ordinary level of tariff reduction commitment in relation to some special 
agricultural products which will be so designated by such members on the criteria of 
food security, livelihood security and rural development.340 
The flexibilities for developing members under agricultural market access are further 
broadened with the introduction, in the framework Agreements, of Special Safeguard 
Mechanism the application of which requires the conclusion of the Doha Round with 
detailed rules on it. Accordingly, developing members are provided with the leverage 
to have recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism and increase tariffs beyond the 
bound rate in the occasion of an import surge or a price fall.341 
Though, the detailed rules on the trigger point and safeguarding remedies is not yet 
agreed, the general application of Special Safeguard Mechanism is very similar to 
the Special Agricultural Safeguard under the Agreement on Agriculture in that both 
safeguard measures will be triggered by an import surge or a price fall and, both 
relieve members from going through the stringent requirements under the 
Agreement on Safeguards.342 However, the Special Safeguard Mechanism is more 
flexible than Special Agricultural Safeguard since application of the former, unlike the 
latter, will not require members to undertake tariffication and reserve such a right 
under their Schedule of commitment.343 Hence, those developing members which 
did not reserve a right for the application of Special Agricultural Safeguard under the 
Uruguay Round will now have recourse to the Special Safeguard Mechanism without 
making any reservation of right. This will enable developing members to have 
quicker access to Special Safeguard Mechanism than to Special Agricultural 
Safeguards given the fact that only 21 developing members have reserved a right for 
the application of Special Agricultural Safeguard.344 This holds especially true for 
                                                            
340 Paragraph 41 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Programme and Paragraph 7 of the 2005 Doha Work 
Programme   
341 Paragraph 42 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Programme and Paragraph 7 of the 2005 Doha Work 
Programme  
342 See Article 5(1) of the Agreement on Agriculture and Paragraph 7 of the 2005 Doha Work Programme  
343 Ibid 
344 Matthews (2005) 6, for the list of WTO members which have reserved a right, see 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_ssg_e.htm> [accessed on 25 January 2009] 
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African members, only 6 of which have reserved a right for the application of Special 
Agricultural Safeguard345 and none of them has ever exercised their right.346 
Most of the above mentioned agricultural market access flexibilities are justified on 
the ground that tariffs form an important source of government revenue in most 
developing countries; hence a greater and immediate reduction of tariffs will have a 
drastic impact on the economy of such countries.347 For instance, as to a study made 
on Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 2000-2003, tariff revenue has accounted for 
more than 40% of the total revenue in ten Sub-Saharan African countries.348   
Besides, some justify the need for Special Safeguard Mechanisms in favour of 
developing countries based on the premise that it helps to increase the price of 
subsidised cheap agricultural imports and thus,349 save domestic producers in 
developing countries from the price depressing effect of agricultural subsidies of 
developed members.350 
Under the domestic support discipline of the Agreement on Agriculture, developing 
members are provided with diverse flexibilities in the calculation and reduction of 
outlays on Amber Box domestic support measures. Regarding the calculation of 
Total AMS, which is the subject of reduction under the Agreement on Agriculture, 
developing members are granted with the flexibility to exclude investment subsidies 
which are generally available to agriculture; agricultural input subsidies generally 
available to low income or resource-poor producers and, domestic support for 
diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops – together referred as Development 
Box –351 from the calculation of Total AMS and thus from their reduction 
commitment.352 Exemption of developing members from undertaking an outlay 
reduction on the Development Box forms part of the flexibilities in favour of such 
members because had it not been for the exemption, outlays on the Development 
                                                            
345 The 6 African members are: Botswana, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tunisia  
346 See Members’ notification on Special Agricultural Safeguard at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm> [accessed on 22 March 2009] 
347 Jensen (2007) 95‐6 
348 The ten countries are: Comoros, Gambia, Niger, Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Togo and 
Uganda, See Osakwe in Morrison and Sarris (eds) (2007) 337  
349 Id, 99 
350 Hoekman, Michalopoulos and Winters in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 540   
351 Matthews (2001) 81 
352 Article 6(2) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
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Box would form part of the Total AMS and be subjected to the general reduction 
commitment.353  
Besides, as a de minimis amount, developing members are allowed to exclude, in 
the calculation of Total AMS, product specific and non-product specific Amber Box 
domestic support measures each of which shall not exceed 10% of the total value of 
production in such countries, while developed countries are entitled to a de minimis 
amount that is smaller by half.354 On the rate of reduction also, developing members 
have undertaken a lesser rate of Total AMS reduction commitment, which is only two 
thirds of the reduction commitment by developed members.355 
Under the third - export subsidies - discipline of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
developing members are given several flexibilities from the general obligations on 
members to cut budgetary outlays on those export subsidies listed under Article 9 (1) 
of the Agreement on Agriculture by 36% and reduce the volume of subsidised 
exports by 21%, over six years of implementation period.356 Accordingly, while 
developing members are required to reduce their budgetary outlays on listed export 
subsidies and their volume of subsidised exports by 24% and 14%, respectively, the 
period for implementation of their commitments is extended up to ten years.357  
Even among export subsidies listed under Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, developing members are allowed to temporarily set-aside their reduction 
commitment on those subsidies which are provided to reduce the costs of marketing 
agricultural exports and grant more favourable internal transport or freight charges 
for export shipments.358 
Lastly, it is worth to point out that least-developed countries are provided with an 
absolute flexibility under the Agreement on Agriculture and the subsequent 
framework Agreements. As per Article 15 (2) of the Agreement on Agriculture, least-
developed country members are freed from undertaking any reduction commitment 
under all the three pillars of agricultural market access, domestic support and export 
                                                            
353 Ibid 
354 Article 6(4)(a) and (b) of the Agreement on Agriculture   
355 Paragraphs 8 and 15 of the Modalities  for  the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the 
Reform Programme, December 1993 (MTN/GNG/MA/W/24)  
356 Article 9(2)(b)(iv) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
357 Ibid 
358 Article 9(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
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subsidies. Hence, such members are entitled to claim all market access benefits 
resulting from trade negotiations between developed and developing members 
without contributing any commitment to such negotiations.359 Exemption of least-
developed members from reduction commitments and their entitlement to 
concessions negotiated by other members through non-reciprocity endures in the 
current Doha Round too with the provisions of the two framework Agreements to this 
effect.360          
4.3- Economic Weight of the Major Agricultural Special and 
Differential Treatment Clauses for African Countries 
The way the WTO functions is based on mercantilist self-interest. It 
is therefore necessary that [developing] countries should be 
expected to define their interests in special and differential 
treatment...361 
The Doha Ministerial Declaration has identified the provision of operationally 
effective and enabling special and differential treatment for developing countries in 
their agricultural trade as one of the major concerns of the Doha Round trade 
negotiations.362 Such an initiative for reconsideration of the existing special and 
differential treatment provisions, being an essential move in the evolutionary 
dynamics of special and differential treatment, poses a question on how much 
effective and relevant the pre-existing special and differential treatment provisions 
were for the beneficiaries. 
Given the fact that special and differential treatments are meant to address the 
developmental needs of developing countries and improve the trade terms of the 
same, an examination of the relevance and effectiveness of special and differential 
treatment clauses requires a prior identification of the crucial trade and 
developmental concerns of developing countries. Examination of the relevance and 
effectiveness of the currently operational special and differential treatment provisions 
                                                            
359  Paragraph  16  of  the  Modalities  for  Establishment  of  Specific  Binding  Commitments  under  the  Reform 
Programme, December 1993 (MTN.GNG/MA/W/24) 
360 See Paragraph 45 under Annex A of  the 2004 Doha Work Programme and Paragraph 142 of  the Revised 
Draft Modalities for Agriculture, July 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3)  
361 Kleen and Page (2005) Executive Summary, VIII  
362 Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration  
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for agricultural trade of Africa being the central aim of this chapter, the previous two 
topics have identified the major concerns of Africa in agricultural trade and the 
currently operating special and differential treatment provisions under agricultural 
trade rules. 
Accordingly, under this section, an examination will be made as to what extent the 
existing special and differential treatment provisions have addressed the needs of 
African countries in agricultural trade and which special and differential treatment 
provisions most facilitate agricultural growth in the continent. To this effect, the 
existing special and differential treatments under agricultural trade rules are 
generally grouped into two categories – special and differential treatments under 
agricultural market access and special and differential treatments under agricultural 
support programs. 
4.3.1- The Use of Special and Differential Treatment under 
Agricultural Market Access in Africa 
It has already been identified under section 4.1 that agricultural exports play a crucial 
role in the overall economic development of most African countries,363 which 
agricultural exports are however greatly hampered by the imposition of high tariffs 
and tariff escalation in most countries of export destination; the prevalence of 
volatility on the world price of most primary agricultural commodities; the lack of 
export diversification and supply side constraints.364 Accordingly, an increase in the 
export volume and value of agricultural products; substitution of primary commodity 
exports by high value and value-added agricultural products as well as diversification 
of agricultural production and export have become the major trade interests of most 
African countries.365 To meet these interests, what African countries principally need 
from the multilateral trading system is: an improved access to agricultural markets of 
major importing countries, which can be gained through greater reduction in the MFN 
tariff rates and/or deeper and more effective preferential market access schemes; a 
                                                            
363 Diaz‐Bonilla, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 27 
364 World Bank Assistance  for Agriculture  in Sub‐Saharan Africa: An  IEG Review  (2007) 9,  see also, Nyangito 
(2004) 7   
365  Paragraphs  9,  12  and  13  of  the WTO African Group  Joint  Proposal  on  the Negotiations  on Agriculture, 
March 2001 (G/AG/NG/W/142) 
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deeper reduction of tariff peaks and escalating tariffs as well as, technical assistance 
for the promotion of productivity and export diversification in the continent.366   
However, as identified in the previous section, the special and differential treatment 
provisions under the market access discipline of the Agreement on Agriculture and 
the subsequent framework Agreements resemble more lessening in the tariff 
reduction commitment of developing members through exclusion of some tariff lines 
from tariffication; imposition of lesser tariff reduction commitment; provision of 
greater tariff protection for special agricultural products and introduction of Special 
Safeguard Mechanisms.367 All these flexibilities enable developing members to apply 
a relatively greater tariff protection on agricultural imports rather than giving better 
market access for their agricultural exports. 
The idea of improving market access opportunities for agricultural exports of 
developing countries, which is the central concern of most African countries and 
other developing members, did not get the well deserved attention under the 
Agreement on Agriculture that provides nothing more than a general aspiration under 
its preamble.368 Accordingly, agricultural exports of developing countries are left to 
benefit from the general and discretionary preferential trading scheme under the 
Enabling Clause, while the issue of tariff peaks and tariff escalation, which are also 
major concerns of African countries, are left to the ongoing Doha Round trade 
negotiations.369 
 
Taking the agricultural trade interests of the continent into consideration, the African 
Group in the WTO Negotiations has presented important market access issues on 
the Doha Round negotiating table. Underlining the point that most value-added 
agricultural exports from Africa face substantially higher tariffs in the major export 
markets,370 the African Group has proposed for a substantial reduction in tariff peaks 
                                                            
366 Paragraphs 2.1 and 2.3 of the Modalities for the Negotiations on Agricultural Commodities Issues: Proposal 
Submitted  by  the  African  Group  to  the  Special  Session  of  the  Committee  on  Agriculture,  June  2006 
(TN/AG/GEN/18)      
367 Annex 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Paragraph 7 of the 2005 Doha Work Programme and Paragraph 
13 of  the Modalities  for  the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under  the Reform Programme, 
December 1993 (MTN/GNG/MA/W/24)  
368 Paragraph 5 under the preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture  
369 See Paragraph 36 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Programme  
370 Paragraph 12 of  the WTO African Group:  Joint Proposal on  the Negotiations on Agriculture, March 2001 
(G/AG/NG/W/142) 
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and tariff escalation facing developing countries’ exports, in addition to the provision 
of improved and binding preferential trade opportunities for agricultural exports from 
developing countries.371 At the same time however, there is a lesser initiative among 
members of this group to take a reciprocal commitment for liberalisation of one’s own 
trade policies due to their craving for the maintenance of a greater policy space.372 
For instance, in its 2001 negotiating proposal, the African Group had proposed the 
introduction of a special and differential treatment that will exclude all developing 
members from taking any tariff reduction commitment on key staples under the Doha 
Round market liberalisation.373 
 
Besides the undertaking of lesser agricultural reform by developing members, the 
idea of agricultural non-reciprocity or exemption of least-developed members from 
the agricultural reform process persists in the Doha Round through the two 
framework Agreements and the 2008 agricultural draft modalities text.374 Here, the 
issue worth examining is: whether it is beneficial for developing and least-developed 
countries to chase after lesser commitments and exemptions from agricultural 
market reform with the instrumentality of special and differential treatments. This 
issue is of a particular concern for Africa given the fact that the majority of the world’s 
least-developed countries are found in this continent. 
 
The adoption of a protectionist or inward-looking approach by developing countries 
in the agricultural trade reform process has its own adverse effect in the agricultural 
growth of these countries.375 The following discussion will examine two of the 
general costs of lesser trade liberalisation or exemption from tariff reduction 
commitment, which costs are: the loss of export opportunities from market 
liberalisation on sensitive products by the developed members and the loss of 
efficiency gain from one’s own trade liberalisation. 
 
                                                            
371 Paragraph 13 of  the WTO African Group:  Joint Proposal on  the Negotiations on Agriculture, March 2001 
(G/AG/NG/W/142)  
372 Jensen (2007) 94‐5 
373 Paragraph 13 of  the WTO African Group:  Joint Proposal on  the Negotiations on Agriculture, March 2001 
(G/AG/NG/W/142) 
374 Paragraph 45 under Annex A of the 2004 Doha Work Programme and Paragraph 142 of the Revised Draft 
Modalities for Agriculture, July 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3) 
375 Ingco and Nash in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 5 
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The first down side of special and differential treatments in the form of application of 
relatively higher agricultural tariff protection by developing members and exemption 
from tariff reduction commitment by least-developed members is the loss of 
aggressive negotiating power by such countries to get an improved access for their 
exports of sensitive agricultural products to the developed countries’ markets.376 
 
As a matter of fact, the WTO is a trade organisation; just like developing members, 
developed members have their own economic, trade and national interests to protect 
and, will be willing to gratuitously assist the developmental and trade needs of 
developing members only to the extent that will not jeopardise their own interests. 
This can be clearly inferred from the preferential trading arrangements of the USA 
and EU in favour of exports from developing countries. Under the African Growth 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which is a preferential arrangement in favour of eligible 
Sub-Saharan African countries for a duty-free export of products to the USA market, 
an express limitation is set on product eligibility in that products which are sensitive 
when imported from African countries are excluded from enjoying any preference.377 
The same is true under the ‘Everything but Arms Initiative’ (EBA) of the EU in which 
sensitive imports of the EU – banana, sugar and rice – are provisionally excluded 
from the preferential scheme.378 Such arrangements prove the fact that the charity of 
developed countries is mostly limited to those areas which are economically and 
politically less-costly, thereby resulting in the exclusion of most sensitive agricultural 
imports of developed members from the non-reciprocal Generalised System of 
Preference.379 Hence, engagement of developing members in reciprocal trade 
concessions is necessary to motivate developed members to undertake a substantial 
market access reform on their sensitive agricultural imports, since the existence of 
reciprocity will render the reform on such sensitive products economically and 
politically less-costly. Elaborating on this view, two writers’ have stated: 
 
Despite the acceptance in the GATT/WTO of the concept of non-
reciprocity, the ground reality is that obtaining reciprocal concession 
by trading partners is politically imperative in all democracies before 
                                                            
376 Ingco and Croome in Ingco and Nash (eds) (2004) 39  
377 <http://www.agoa.gov/eligiblity/product_eligiblity.htm> [accessed on 7 February 2009] 
378 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba/index_en.htm> [accessed on 10 February  2009] 
379 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 19‐29 
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any trade liberalisation effort is undertaken affecting sensitive 
sectors of the economy...when reciprocal concessions are not 
made by developing countries, their developed partners follow the 
line of least resistance and make only small reduction of tariffs in 
sensitive sectors.380 
 
In fact, one of the major reasons for the prevalence of high tariffs in most developed 
countries on products of greater export interest to developing countries, especially 
agricultural products, is the undertaking of smaller reciprocal concessions by 
developing members due to the principle of non-reciprocity in the GATT era and, the 
adoption of high ceiling bindings and lesser reduction commitments under the 
Uruguay Round.381 
 
Hence, taking into account the crucial role of increased agricultural export in the 
economy of most African countries and the fact that the significant part of welfare 
gain from agricultural reform concentrates on the liberalisation of sensitive 
agricultural products,382 it is logically advisable for African countries to opt for an 
offensive approach as far as agricultural market access is concerned and press for 
more special and differential treatment in the form of deeper reduction of MFN 
agricultural tariff rates by developed members and increased preferential market 
access opportunities for sensitive agricultural exports, rather than a lesser and 
flexible market access commitment for themselves. 
 
The second cost of those special and differential treatments which entitle developing 
members to a relatively higher agricultural tariff protection and exempt least-
developed members from tariff reduction commitment is the loss of efficiency gains 
from one’s own trade liberalisation. It is generally true that countries earn increased 
efficiency gains from their own liberal trade policies383 and the more flexibility 
developing members are given to undertake lesser agricultural tariff reduction 
commitment, the smaller their welfare gain will become from the whole agricultural 
                                                            
380 Hoda and Ashok (2003) 18 
381 Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 342 
382  It  is estimated by Anderson and Martin  that market  reform on  sensitive agricultural products  can bring 
three quarter of the total welfare gain from agricultural reform. See Anderson and Martin (2005) 1314  
383 Anderson and Martin (2005) 1311 
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reform process.384 In a projection done on the potential welfare gains that can be 
earned from the Doha Round agricultural reform, it is established that the efficiency 
gains of most developing countries will raise if such countries undertake a 
multilateral agricultural tariff liberalisation with no flexibility in the form of lesser 
reduction or exclusion from reduction commitment.385 Particularly, in an estimate 
done for Sub-Saharan African countries, while agricultural reform will contribute 78% 
to the region’s total welfare gain from multilateral trade liberalisation, one third of 
such welfare gain will come from the liberalisation of their own agricultural trade 
policies.386 This shows the vital role of agricultural market liberalisation in developing 
countries, particularly in African countries, for the maximisation of their own welfare 
gains and, the existence of a considerable welfare loss as an opportunity cost of 
developing countries’ flexibility to undertake lesser agricultural market liberalisation. 
 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that the flexibility to undertake lesser or no 
agricultural tariff reduction commitment is entirely of no use for developing and least-
developed countries. Given the smaller application of agricultural subsidies in most 
developing countries,387 import duties are the only practically available trade policy 
instrument that can be used for stabilisation of domestic agricultural markets and 
protection of domestic producers from cheap and subsidised agricultural imports.388 
This holds also true for African countries where the price depressing effects of 
developed countries’ agricultural support programmes is severe.389 However, the 
market stabilisation role of tariffs can hardly justify the flexibility for lesser tariff 
reduction commitment in the current Doha Round since developing countries are to 
be provided with the flexibility to apply Special Safeguard Mechanisms for 
stabilisation of agricultural markets from an import surge or a price fall. 
 
Besides, the existence of a wider gap between the bound and applied agricultural 
tariff rates in most developing countries renders a reciprocal market liberalisation in 
                                                            
384 Anderson and Martin in Anderson and Martin (eds) (2006) 31  
385 Anderson, Martin and Mensbrugghe in Anderson and Martin (eds) (2006) 361  
386 Africa Development Indicators (2006) 4 
387 Josling in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 60 
388 Hoekman, Michalopoulos and Winters in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 555) 
389 Zunckel (2004) 1 
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such countries an important element of the general agricultural reform.390 Particularly 
in Africa, the average overhang between the bound and applied agricultural tariff 
exceeds 50%, which overhang is even more than 100% in some African countries 
like: Gambia, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia.391 
 
In addition to the urge to undertake a lesser degree of liberalisation on their own 
agricultural tariffs, some preference receiving African countries, together with other 
preference receiving developing members, have a less-enthusiastic attitude towards 
a deeper reduction of agricultural tariffs by preference giving developed members 
because of the fear of losing the margin of preference that they have been enjoying 
in the pre-reform period.392 In fact, the issue of preference erosion is lately playing a 
big role in the creation of a division in the negotiating position of African countries as 
a group.393 
 
However, as examined in the previous chapters, the Generalised System of 
Preference is by itself not secured enough to be relied upon. Primarily, due to the 
discretionary nature of the preferential trading system, there is no assurance for the 
continued existence of pre-existing preferences.394 Secondly, it is already said that 
both the scope and level of preference agricultural products are enjoying is much 
lesser than that of industrial products,395 which is in the reverse of the trade and 
developmental needs of most African countries. Besides, as examined earlier, a 
deliberate exclusion is made on sensitive agricultural imports under the AGOA and 
EBA, which, together with temporary nature of such preferential arrangements, 
reduces the effectiveness and reliability of the preferential system. 
 
Besides, the significant portion of preferential market access benefits are dominated 
by few advanced developing members, more than 50% of which benefit is enjoyed 
                                                            
390 Matthews (2005) 5 
391 Low in Bermann and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 350‐2 
392 Zunckel (2004) 1 
393 While most African countries, as agricultural exporters, want a deeper  reduction of agricultural  tariffs  in 
developed countries, some preference receiving African countries want to maintain their margin of preference 
through lesser liberalisation of MFN tariffs by preference giving developed countries     
394 Garcia (2004) 303 
395 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 19‐20 
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by Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan.396 Hence, rather than the Generalised 
System of Preference,  the best way for African countries to get a secured and 
predictable access to the world agricultural market is through multilateral tariff 
liberalisation on MFN basis. Yet, the Generalised System of preference is more 
relevant for African countries than other forms of special and differential treatment 
which entitle developing members to the flexibility to take lesser market liberalisation 
commitments,397 since the major concern of African countries in agricultural trade is 
an improved market access to their primary and value-added agricultural 
commodities. 
 
In fact, concerning preferential market access, African countries seem to have a 
common and strong stand in looking for a broadened and secured preferential 
access to the markets of major agricultural importing developed members. In this 
regard, under their joint proposal in 2001, African countries have proposed for all 
preferential trade arrangements to have a binding power on preference giving 
members under the framework of the Agreement on Agriculture.398 
 
4.3.2- The Use of Special and Differential Treatment under 
Agricultural Support Programmes in Africa 
Under the domestic support and export subsidy pillars of agricultural trade rules, 
developing members are allowed to provide agricultural subsidies with wider 
flexibilities through lesser reduction of AMS and export subsidy outlays; free 
application of the Development Box domestic support measures; provision of higher 
de minimis amount and temporary exclusion of outlays on some export subsidies 
from reduction commitment.399 
 
As examined in detail under chapter III, a significant share of the world total 
agricultural subsidies are provided by developed countries,400 the trade distorting 
                                                            
396 Michalopoulos (2000) 10  
397 Kessie in Berman and Mavroidis (eds) (2007) 21 
398 Paragraph 13 of  the WTO African Group:  Joint Proposal on  the Negotiations on Agriculture, March 2001 
(G/AG/NG/W/142)   
399 Articles 6(2), 6(4), 9(2)(b)(iv) and 9(4) of the Agreement on Agriculture and Paragraph 15 of the Modalities 
for  the  Establishment  of  Specific  Binding  Commitments  under  the  Reform  Programme,  December  1993 
(MTN/GNG/MA/W/24)    
400 Anderson in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 46 
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effect of which subsidies is however considerably higher on poor and less-subsidised 
agricultural producers in developing countries.401 There are generally two alternative 
ways available to rectify the damages that arise from the trade distorting agricultural 
support programmes of developed countries. 
 
The first way is to permit developing countries to provide export subsidies and 
domestic support measures to a much greater level than that of developed countries 
so as to compensate the former for the past agricultural trade distortion that has 
operated at their detriment and thus, bring a trade balance between developed and 
developing countries. However, this approach will not abolish the ongoing distortion 
in the world agricultural market; rather it will authorise the continuation of distortion 
by parties other than those which are responsible for the current distortion. 
 
The alternative way is to abolish future trade distortions and impediments on 
agricultural exports of developing countries through the total elimination of trade 
distorting domestic support measures and export subsidies. This way, since both 
developing and developed countries will provide no trade distorting agricultural 
subsidies, they will have an equal competition floor in future trade relations and, the 
past trade distortion and inequality against developing countries can be 
compensated through technical assistance and/or preferential market access in 
favour of developing countries. This approach, unlike the first one, can abolish trade 
distortions while simultaneously bringing the trade equilibrium between developed 
and developing countries as far as agricultural subsidies are concerned. 
 
If the above two approaches are examined from the view point of developing states, 
particularly African countries, the first approach is not sound since it is not financially 
feasible for such countries to provide export subsidies and domestic support 
measures to an extent that can neutralise the trade distortion created by the export 
subsidy and domestic support measures of developed countries.402 As to the World 
Development Report 2008, only 4% of the total government spending in most African 
countries goes to the Agricultural sector.403 This figure is too small as compared to 
                                                            
401 Josling in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 60 
402 Hoekman, Michalopoulos and Winters in Hoekman and Ozden (eds) (2006) 555 
403 World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (2007) 40  
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the total agricultural support in OECD countries, which roughly is equal to the sum 
annual GDP of all Sub-Saharan African countries.404 
 
As to members’ notification to the WTO Committee on Agriculture, the Total bound 
AMS level of South Africa and Morocco, which are the only two African members 
with scheduled AMS commitment, is 2,015 million Rand and 706 million DHS, 
respectively, while the Total bound AMS level of the EC and USA is 67,159 million 
Euro and 19,103 million USD, respectively.405 This shows how small the Total AMS 
levels of the above two African members is as compared to the scheduled AMS 
levels of the major developed members. Yet, due to limited financial resources and 
the existence of other domestic policy priorities, the South African government has 
provided no Amber Box domestic support measures under any of its report period up 
until 2008.406   
 
In an estimate done for the years immediately before implementation of the 
commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture, the EU provides 83% of the world 
export subsidies while export subsidies of the USA, Norway and Switzerland 
accounts for 98% of the remaining 17% of the world export subsidies.407 This 
indicates the fact that even before a monetary limitation was set on the provision of 
export subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture, it was the developed countries 
that were providing almost all of the world export subsidies and, the application of 
export subsidies in developing countries, including in Africa, was very insignificant 
mainly because of financial and not legal limitations. 
 
Besides, the provision of greater amount of export subsidies and domestic support 
measures should not be a policy choice for African countries since such agricultural 
support programmes have their own negative economic implications which most 
African countries can hardly carry.408 Ordinarily, the provision of domestic support 
measures and export subsidies needs reallocation of resources, which are scarce in 
                                                            
404 The WTO Director‐General Annual Report (2005) 23 
405 See members’ notification on domestic support commitments, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agric_e.htm> [accessed on 17 February 2009] 
406 Ibid 
407 Anderson in Hoekman and Martin (eds) (2003) 46  
408 Diaz‐Bonilla, Robinson, Thomas and Yanoma (2003) 21 
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all African countries, and, mostly results in allocative distortions409 and production 
inefficiencies on the economy of subsidising countries.410   
 
However most importantly, even if they want to provide agricultural subsidies and get 
the financial means to do so, almost all African countries do not even have the option 
to provide Amber Box domestic support measures and export subsidies due to the 
requirement of scheduling outlays on agricultural subsidies under the Agreement on 
Agriculture.411 As it is examined under section 3.3.2, the Agreement on Agriculture 
restricts the provision of Amber Box domestic support measures only to those 
members that have scheduled their Total AMS commitment and limits other 
members to the de minimis level.412 Of all African countries which are members to 
the WTO, it is only South Africa and Morocco that have scheduled their Total AMS 
outlays.413 Hence, South Africa and Morocco are the only two African countries 
which can provide Amber Box domestic support measures beyond the de minimis 
level, in accordance with their reduction commitment. Even from the two African 
countries, it is only Morocco that is in the category of developing members and thus, 
a beneficiary of special and differential treatment under the WTO. Hence, the 
flexibilities given for developing members to undertake a lower and slower AMS 
reduction commitment is totally not relevant for African countries, except for 
Morocco, since they are denied of the provision of Amber Box domestic support 
measures in any amount greater than the de minimis level. 
 
The same is true for listed agricultural export subsidies the application of which is 
restricted among 25 members which have scheduled their outlays on agricultural 
export subsidies.414 Here also, South Africa is the only African country that has 
scheduled its export subsidy outlays and thus, is entitled to provide any of those 
export subsidies listed under Article 9 (1) of the Agreement on Agriculture.415 But, 
since South Africa is not a developing member and thus a beneficiary of special and 
                                                            
409 Keck and Low (2004) 18 
410 Desta (2002) 312 
411 Articles 7 and 3(3) of the Agreement on Agriculture 
412 Article 7 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
413  <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm>  [accessed  on  20  January 
2009] 
414 Article 3(3) of the Agreement on Agriculture  
415 Josling in McCalla and Nash (eds) (2007) vol.1, 29 
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differential treatment, the flexibility to undertake a lesser and slower export subsidy 
reduction commitment under the Agreement on Agriculture works in favour of no 
African country. In general, the requirement of scheduling outlays on agricultural 
subsidies renders those forms of special and differential treatment which entitle 
lesser and slower reduction of AMS and export subsidy outlays for developing 
countries entirely of no use for African countries. 
 
Hence, the general trade distorting effect of Amber Box domestic support measures 
and export subsidies largely applied by developed countries, coupled with the 
financial constraint and legal limitation on African countries not to apply such 
agricultural support measures makes the elimination or reduction to a very minimal 
amount of such support programmes in developed countries the only way to bring a 
fair and market oriented agricultural trading system in the global market. 
 
4.4- Conclusion 
An overall economic development in most African countries is directly or indirectly 
reliant on agricultural growth and particularly on a growth in agricultural exports. This 
is due to the fact that agriculture serves as a major employer; a significant source of 
export and income as well as a principal means of rural livelihood in most part of 
Africa. However, owing to the maintenance of high agricultural tariffs, tariff peaks and 
tariff escalation by most developed countries; the provision of greater agricultural 
subsidies by the same as well as the prevalence of low level of agricultural 
productivity and lack of export diversification in most part of Africa, export share of 
the continent in the world agricultural trade is too small, which share is also in a 
declining trend for the past three decades. 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture and subsequent framework Agreements of the Doha 
Round provide developing members with various flexibilities to apply greater tariff 
protection and agricultural subsidies in the form of special and differential treatment. 
Under agricultural market access, while developing members are allowed to 
undertake lesser tariff reduction commitment, they are also entitled to deviate from 
their ordinary reduction commitment and impose higher tariffs on the occasion of 
import surges or price falls or, in relation to some commodities that they designate as 
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special. Under the disciplines of agricultural subsidies too, in addition to undertaking 
lesser reduction commitment on Amber Box domestic support measures and export 
subsidy outlays, developing members are given further flexibilities to exclude certain 
trade distorting domestic support measures and export subsidies from their reduction 
commitment. The flexibility gets deeper for least-developed members, which are 
totally excluded from undertaking any reduction commitment both on their 
agricultural tariffs and subsidy outlays. 
 
Though most African countries, as developing and least-developed members to the 
WTO, are given greater flexibilities to maintain higher agricultural tariffs, it is not 
always in the interest of such countries to maintain high tariffs. By maintaining higher 
agricultural tariffs, most African countries will forfeit the possibility of getting an 
improved market access for their agricultural commodities that are import sensitive in 
most developed countries. Also, the efficiency gains of most developing members 
from agricultural trade reform diminish with the maintenance of higher agricultural 
tariffs. 
 
African Countries are not also beneficiaries of most of the flexibilities under domestic 
support and export subsidy disciplines which entitle developing members to have a 
greater level of outlays on Amber Box domestic support measures and export 
subsidies. While the majority of African countries do not even have the right to 
provide listed export subsidies and exceed the de minimis level in their application of 
Amber Box domestic support measures, those few African members which have 
reserved a right for the application of Amber Box domestic support measures and 
export subsidies have also refrained from applying them due to financial constraints 
and the fear of allocative distortion that follows the application such agricultural 
support programmes.     
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1- Conclusion  
Since the conceptual inception of special and differential treatment in the 1950’s, 
developing members of the WTO have been provided with wider ranges of 
flexibilities and preferences in the multilateral trade arena. Based on the changing 
trade and economic interests of developing members at different junctures, various 
exceptions and deviations have been introduced under the rule based multilateral 
trading system, which have consistently broadened the scope of special and 
differential treatment. 
Though the multilateral trading system was first designed to provide homogeneous 
rights and obligations to all its members, the prevalence of heterogeneous trade and 
financial interests among different members at different levels of economic 
development had hindered the practicability of a ‘one size fits all’ approach. 
Accordingly, differentiation in the treatment of developed and developing members 
and preference in favour of the latter had its foundation in the early days of the GATT 
with the core aspiration of enhancing the industrial development and export earnings 
of developing members through their better and easier integration into the 
multilateral trading system. 
However, experience in the last five decades has proved that the application of most 
special and differential treatment provisions is not as easy and helpful as it appears 
on print. The principle of non-reciprocity had driven most developing members to 
become passive participants in the global trading system, only to have it backfire 
against them resulting in higher tariff regimes for most products of export interest to 
such members. The discretionary nature of the Generalised System of Preference, 
together with the prevalent exclusion of products of vital export interest to most 
developing countries, especially agricultural products, from this system and/or the 
provision of lesser degree of tariff preference for such products have also impeded 
the reliability and effectiveness of the preferential trading system as a form of special 
and differential treatment. 
In spite of the fact that foreign earnings of most developing members is greatly 
dependent on agricultural exports, the global trade in agricultural products has long 
been the most protected and distorted sector in the multilateral trading system. 
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Trade in agricultural products is the only sector in the multilateral trading system 
where quantitative restrictions are not simply abolished but are changed into tariff 
‘equivalents’; members can still legitimately provide export subsidies and, imports 
face tariff escalation based on their level of processing. In most developed countries, 
agricultural tariffs are by far greater than tariffs applied on non-agricultural products, 
while the level of overhang between bound and applied agricultural tariffs of most 
developing members is still too high. 
The generous agricultural support programmes of most developed members have 
also played a big role in distorting the global agricultural market to the detriment of 
poor agricultural producers in developing countries. Trade distorting domestic 
support measures and export subsidies of most developed members have well 
contributed to the prevailing price volatility in the world agricultural market that 
exacerbates the vulnerability of agricultural producers in most developing countries. 
Trade distorting domestic support measures and export subsidies of developed 
countries have also contributed to the maintenance of high bound agricultural tariffs 
by most developing countries since such countries need greater policy space, in the 
form of higher bound tariffs, for market stabilisation and protection of domestic 
producers from the adverse effects of developed countries’ trade distorting 
agricultural support programmes.    
While the GATT exceptions for the flexible application of quantitative restrictions and 
export subsidies in relation to agricultural products had initially paved the way for 
distortion of the global trade in agricultural products, subsequent waivers and 
derogative authorisations from the general GATT rules have intensified agricultural 
protectionism and support in most developed countries. Though some new 
measures were adopted under the Uruguay Round of negotiations for the disciplining 
of the world trade in agricultural products, the disciplines were not strict enough to 
eliminate or even considerably reduce tariff peaks, tariff escalation, trade distorting 
domestic support measures and export subsidies in the agricultural market. So far, 
the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations also bring nothing more concrete than 
two framework Agreements on agricultural modalities such that agricultural trade 
continues being the most protected and distorted sector in the multilateral trading 
system. 
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Whereas those days when developing members were entitled to simply benefit from 
negotiated market access opportunities without making any reciprocal concessions 
are long over, developing members are still provided with diverse flexibilities in their 
commitments under agricultural market access, domestic support and export subsidy 
disciplines. Yet, regardless of the fact that most developing countries have a huge 
export interest in agricultural commodities, the Agreement on Agriculture pays less 
attention to those forms of special and differential treatment that provide improved 
market access opportunities for agricultural exports of developing members. Rather, 
under the Agreement on Agriculture, while developing members are granted greater 
flexibilities to undertake lesser and slower reduction commitments on agricultural 
tariffs, trade distorting domestic support measures and export subsidy outlays, least-
developed members are totally exempted from undertaking any commitment as a 
prolongation of non-reciprocity. 
Though most African countries, as developing and least-developed members of the 
WTO, are given greater flexibilities to maintain higher agricultural tariffs, it is not 
always in the interest of such countries to maintain high tariffs. This is mainly 
because it discourages developed members from undertaking deeper tariff reduction 
commitments and/or giving preferential trade opportunities on their sensitive 
agricultural imports, which is crucial for agricultural export growth of most African 
countries. Moreover, the more flexibility developing members are given to maintain 
higher agricultural tariffs, the lesser their efficiency gains will become from the whole 
agricultural trade reform process. 
 
Most of the flexibilities under domestic support and export subsidy disciplines are 
also not relevant for African members since almost all of them are prohibited from 
providing listed export subsidies and applying Amber Box domestic support 
measures in any amount greater than the de minimis level. Even for those few 
African members which have reserved a right for the application of Amber Box 
domestic support measures and export subsidies, the flexibility to provide subsidies 
in a greater amount has proven not to be economically worthwhile, since such 
countries are not in the financial position to compete with the large scale agricultural 
subsidies of developed members. Also, the subsidies they provide predominantly 
form part of the Green Box and Blue Box domestic support measures, the provision 
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of both of which is not a subject of members’ reduction commitments, calling for no 
special and differential treatment to increase outlays on such domestic support 
measures. 
 
5.2- Recommendations 
Based on the findings and conclusions reached in respect of the economic weight 
and effectiveness of the different special and differential treatment provisions for 
African countries, the following measures should be taken into consideration to 
maximise the benefit of African countries in the global agricultural trade, particularly 
from the application of special and differential treatments. 
First and foremost, taking into account the fact that reduction of tariffs on MFN basis 
is a more secured means of getting improved market access, African countries 
should develop an aggressive negotiating approach for a significant reduction of the 
MFN tariff bindings of developed members on their sensitive agricultural 
commodities, the importation of which is still highly protected. In this regard, African 
countries should consider making concessions for the reduction of their bound 
agricultural tariffs on areas where they have greater tariff overhang, as a negotiating 
tool to get improved market access in developed countries.  
African countries should also challenge the bias against agricultural commodities 
under the Generalised System of Preference. In this respect, African countries 
should push for an extension in the scope and degree of preference developed 
members provide to agricultural commodities and make sure that agricultural 
products of greater export interest to them are incorporated under the preferential 
system. Most African countries being least-developed members to the WTO should 
also press for extension of the duty-free quota-free scheme to all agricultural 
products of least-developed members so that developed countries will not have the 
leverage to exclude their sensitive products and products of greater export interest to 
the beneficiaries from the scheme. 
To greatly make use of their comparative advantage in agricultural production, 
African countries need to create a strong link between their agricultural and industrial 
sectors as well as expand their export base from primary agricultural commodities to 
processed and semi-processed agricultural products. This can be achieved through 
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the provision of incentives for private investments on the production and export of 
processed and semi-processed agricultural commodities. Such investment is crucial 
to lessen the vulnerability of African countries from price volatility that is prevalent in 
the global market for primary agricultural commodities. To this end, African countries 
should also develop a strong position towards elimination of tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation on processed and semi-processed agricultural products which greatly 
discourage exportation of value-added and high priced agricultural commodities. 
Regarding trade distorting domestic support measures and export subsidies, African 
countries should adopt a firm stand for a quicker elimination of both since only 
agricultural producers and exporters in a few developed countries are great 
beneficiaries of such support programmes while agricultural producers in most 
African countries are direct victims of the trade distorting effect of such support 
programmes. In this regard, African countries should not accept flexibilities for a 
greater provision of trade distorting domestic support measures and export subsidies 
as a compromise for the continued application of such trade distorting agricultural 
support programmes in developed countries since the very provision of export 
subsidies and trade distorting domestic support measures by most African countries 
is legally restricted under the Agreement on Agriculture. 
Provided that an agreement is reached for the total elimination or substantial 
reduction of outlays on trade distorting domestic support measures and export 
subsidies, African countries should develop a political willingness to make reciprocal 
concessions for the reduction of their high bound agricultural tariffs in exchange for 
better market access for their agricultural commodities into major export destinations 
like the EU, especially on sensitive and highly protected areas. 
Most importantly, African countries should consider the formation of a strong and 
effective regional trading block amongst themselves on the basis of the Enabling 
Clause that provides the possibility for preferential trading arrangements among 
developing countries on less strict criteria than under the GATT. Given the prevalent 
proliferation of diverse regional agreements and a consequent overlapping of 
membership in the continent, African countries need to adopt a consolidated 
approach and bring the different regional integration efforts together for a deeper and 
faster regional integration process in the continent. The formation of a strong 
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regional agricultural market can be an advantageous move for most African 
countries since the level of distortion of such a regional agricultural market will be 
lesser, given the fact that developed countries are major providers of agricultural 
subsidies and so, major distorters of the global trade in agricultural commodities. 
Hence, the promotion of a regional agricultural market can give African countries the 
benefit of trading on relatively equal terms and with less distortion which thus, will 
stimulate them to safely open up their respective domestic agricultural markets 
without the fear of over flooding of cheaper subsidised imports. 
Moreover, increased regional trading can enable African countries to acquire a better 
trade share in the global agricultural market which in turn will strengthen their 
bargaining power in the multilateral trading system as a regional block. In general, 
through the promotion of regional trade among themselves, African countries can 
minimise the costs and trade barriers their agricultural products face in 
intercontinental trade. However, to effectively trade among themselves, African 
countries need to diversify their export basis and improve their supply side capacity 
for which, they should press for more comprehensive technical and financial 
assistance through the aid for trade programme. 
Generally, African countries should play a proactive role in future agricultural trade 
negotiations and make sure that their interests and concerns are well 
accommodated under special and differential treatment provisions. Yet, they should 
not accept special and differential treatment at the expense of deeper and quicker 
agricultural reform process since they will benefit more from a freer and market 
oriented agricultural trading system.   
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